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THE CASE AGAINST A STRICT LIABILITY
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE PENALTY
Kathleen DeLaney Thomas*
The latest wave in tax shelter reform is the recent codification of the
so-called “economic substance doctrine” and the accompanying strict
liability penalty for violations of the doctrine. The new strict liability
penalty has been criticized by tax scholars and practitioners for being
unfair and disproportionate. However, most commentators have not
evaluated whether there is any need for a separate penalty for violations of
the economic substance doctrine at all, strict liability or otherwise. The
first part of this Article considers the new economic substance penalty in
light of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters and argues that a
separate penalty provision for violations of the economic substance
doctrine should not have been enacted. This Article will demonstrate that
the current accuracy-related penalty regime is sufficient to address
transactions that violate the economic substance doctrine and that the new
penalty adds significant and undue complexity to the current regime.
This Article will then explore the strict liability aspect of the penalty
and consider whether there is any justification for carving out transactions
that violate the economic substance doctrine as especially deserving of
strict liability as compared to other tax shelter transactions. Congress’s
justifications for the new strict liability penalty largely focus on taxpayer
deterrence and reducing disadvantages to the IRS in enforcing penalties.
However, Congress has failed to articulate why violations of the economic
substance doctrine have been singled out for strict liability when other tax
shelter penalties contain taxpayer defenses. The only way to properly
justify a new tax shelter penalty with strict liability would be to tie that
penalty to the most egregious forms of taxpayer misconduct, but there
appears to be no link between violations of economic substance and the
* Associate, Cooley LLP. B.S., The College of William & Mary, 2001; J.D., New
York University School of Law, 2005; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 2010.
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worst kinds of tax shelters. Given that violations of the economic substance
doctrine are not a proxy for the most abusive tax shelter transactions, this
Article concludes that the imposition of a strict liability penalty cannot be
reconciled with other tax shelter penalties that provide for various forms of
a reasonable cause defense.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tax shelters have plagued the IRS for decades, particularly because
they are a moving target. Taxpayers continually find new ways to achieve
unintended tax benefits through creative, technical readings of the Internal
Revenue Code. Because participation in tax shelters is so difficult to
prohibit ex ante, Congress has long relied on tax penalties to discourage
this conduct. Starting in the early 1980s, three distinct accuracy-related
penalties were introduced to the Internal Revenue Code to specifically
address tax shelter transactions.1 These provisions attack tax shelters from
several angles, penalizing transactions designed to inflate a taxpayer‟s
basis,2 transactions with a significant purpose of tax avoidance,3 and
reportable and listed transactions that have been specifically identified as
having the potential for abuse.4
With each new penalty, Congress has attempted to take a harder line
on tax shelter participants. As these provisions have been amended over
time, taxpayer defenses have either been removed or pared down
significantly.5 However, as new, more potent penalty provisions have been
added to the IRS‟s arsenal in its fight against tax shelters, the older penalty
provisions have been left largely intact. The result is that for any one
transaction, a complicated matrix of penalty possibilities exists, with
different rates and taxpayer defenses available depending on which penalty
is applied.6
The latest wave in tax shelter reform is the recent codification of the
so-called “economic substance doctrine” and the accompanying strict
liability penalty for violations of the doctrine. The penalty was signed into
law on March 30, 2010, as part of the health care reconciliation bill passed
by Congress.7 The new legislation provides for a 20 percent penalty for
1. See infra Part II.A. Additionally, there are penalties specifically aimed at tax
shelter transactions that are not considered “accuracy-related” penalties. See infra text
accompanying note 17.
2. See I.R.C. § 6662(h) (West 2010) (gross valuation misstatement penalty).
3. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2010) (substantial understatement penalty for tax
shelter transactions).
4. See I.R.C. § 6662A (West 2010) (reportable transaction understatement penalty).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part IV.A.4.
7. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., §

2011]

STRICT LIABILITY ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE PENALTY

447

disclosed transactions that violate the economic substance doctrine, and a
40 percent penalty for undisclosed transactions.8 The penalty also provides
for strict liability, meaning no reasonable cause or other defenses are
available to taxpayers.9 The new economic substance penalty adds yet
another layer to the existing tax shelter penalty matrix.
Justifications for the new strict liability penalty largely focus on
taxpayer deterrence and reducing disadvantages to the IRS in enforcing
penalties.10 However, proponents of the penalty have failed to explain why
the standard for tax shelter penalties has evolved into strict liability in the
context of the economic substance doctrine. Tax shelter penalties have
become harsher over time, yet it is unclear whether the strict liability
penalty represents a new Congressional attitude towards cracking down on
all tax shelter transactions or whether violations of the economic substance
doctrine deserve special treatment separate and apart from tax shelter
transactions covered by the existing penalty regime.
On the other side of the debate, the strict liability penalty has been
criticized by tax scholars and practitioners for being unfair and
disproportionate.11 The criticisms generally focus on the fundamental
problems with strict liability, both as it relates to tax penalties in general
and as it relates to the economic substance doctrine. However, the
controversy generated by the strict liability aspect of the new penalty has
resulted in a tendency to view the penalty in a vacuum. What most
commentators have not done is evaluate whether there is any need for a
separate penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine at all,
and whether an accuracy-related penalty that provides for strict liability
belongs in the current penalty regime.12
This Article will consider the new economic substance penalty in light
of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters and argue that a separate
strict liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine
should not have been enacted. To be clear, this Article does not attempt to
1409 (2010). The Obama administration had also supported a strict liability penalty for
violations of the economic substance doctrine. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH
CONG., JCS-3-09, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT‟S
FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL; PART TWO: BUSINESS TAX PROVISIONS (Comm. Print
2009)
[hereinafter
JCS-3-09],
available
at
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=7.
8. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., §
1409 (2010).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-206, at 91-92 (2007); JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 63.
11. See infra note 98.
12. Technically, the new economic substance penalty has now become part of the
current penalty regime. For purposes of this Article, however, I will use the phrase “current
penalty regime” to mean the accuracy-related penalties that existed immediately prior to the
enactment of the new economic substance penalty.

448

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 13:2

address whether strict liability is ever appropriate in the context of tax
penalties, nor does it address the merits of a reasonable cause defense to the
economic substance penalty. Rather, this Article examines whether a new
strict liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine
should be part of the current accuracy-related penalty regime. My claim is
that a fourth tax shelter penalty is redundant in light of the current
accuracy-related penalties applicable to tax shelters, and that singling out
the economic substance doctrine for strict liability cannot be justified when
this standard has not been applied to other tax shelter penalties.
First, the new economic substance penalty results in significant
overlap with other tax shelter penalties, as there don‟t appear to be
transactions that would fall under the economic substance doctrine that are
not covered by these other penalties. For example, it is hard to conceive of
a transaction that violates the economic substance doctrine that wouldn‟t
also meet the broad definition of “tax shelter” for purposes of the
substantial understatement penalty under I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C).13
Congress has not identified what types of transactions it intended to capture
with the new economic substance penalty that are not covered by the
current tax shelter penalties.
Second, adding a fourth accuracy-related penalty aimed at tax shelters,
with its own set of standards, adds significant and unnecessary complexity
to the tax shelter penalty regime. Tax penalties should be consistent and
understandable, which encourages compliance by helping taxpayers
understand the potential consequences of their conduct.14 In contrast to
these objectives, the economic substance penalty further complicates the
existing penalty matrix and makes it difficult for taxpayers to understand
and predict the consequences of their behavior. Courts are already divided
over which of the existing accuracy-related penalties should apply in the
case of tax shelters,15 and it appears that the IRS will have the ability to
pick and choose between the new economic substance penalty and the
accuracy-related penalties already at its disposal.
Third, even if a separate penalty for violations of the economic
substance doctrine were justifiable, the strict liability aspect of the penalty
cannot be reconciled with the defenses available for other tax shelter
penalties. The economic substance doctrine is a judicial doctrine used to
disallow tax benefits not intended by the Internal Revenue Code.16 It does

13. A “tax shelter” is defined as “a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or
arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership,
entity, plan or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.” I.R.C. §
6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2010).
14. See infra Part IV.B.1.
15. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
16. See infra Part II.B.1.
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not identify a new type of behavior not anticipated by other tax shelter
penalties, but rather provides a legal basis to disallow tax shelter benefits
where other substantive provisions of the tax law fall short. Given that
violations of the economic substance doctrine do not represent a unique
subset of taxpayer behavior, there is no reason why taxpayer defenses to an
economic substance penalty should be more limited than the defenses to
other tax shelter penalties.
Fourth, carving out violations of the economic substance doctrine as a
unique subset of tax shelter transactions with a stricter penalty as compared
to other tax shelter penalties treats similarly situated taxpayers differently,
leading to unjust and even absurd results. Based on the arguments set forth
above, I conclude that a new strict liability penalty for violations of the
economic substance doctrine should not have been adopted.
This article will proceed as follows: Part II offers an overview of the
current penalties applicable to tax shelter transactions, exclusive of the new
economic substance penalty. It also provides a brief overview of the
economic substance doctrine and the application of the current penalty
regime to violations of the doctrine by courts and the IRS prior to the
codification of the economic substance doctrine and the enactment of the
new economic substance penalty. Part III describes the legislation that was
recently enacted and summarizes the primary justifications for and
criticisms of the new penalty. Part IV argues against a separate economic
substance penalty in light of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters.
Part V critiques the strict liability aspect of the new economic substance
penalty as it relates to the standards in other tax shelter penalties. Part VI
concludes.
II.

OVERVIEW OF ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTIES AND THE ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE

A.

The Evolution of Accuracy-Related Penalties Aimed at Tax Shelters
Over the past several decades, and prior to the recent codification of
the economic substance doctrine, three accuracy-related penalties were
added to the Internal Revenue Code to address the tax shelter epidemic.17
17. “Accuracy-related” penalties are generally based on a substantively incorrect return
position. See I.R.C. §§ 6662 and 6662A (West 2010). There are a number of penalties that
are not accuracy-related penalties that are intended to address other aspects of tax shelter
transactions. These include penalties for failure to furnish information regarding reportable
transactions under I.R.C. § 6706; failure to include reportable transaction information with a
return under I.R.C. § 6707A; failure to maintain lists of advisees with respect to material
transactions under I.R.C. §6708; and the penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters under
I.R.C. § 6700.
Additionally, there are accuracy-related penalties that are not specifically targeted at tax
shelter transactions, although the IRS could choose to apply them to any incorrect return
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An examination of how these penalties have evolved over time provides the
historical backdrop for the recent legislation that added a strict liability
penalty to the Code for violations of the economic substance doctrine.
These prior tax shelter penalties have all provided taxpayer defenses, and
Congress has stated as recently as 2003 that it did not intend to provide for
strict liability for tax shelter transactions.18 However, the recent trend has
been to make tax shelter penalties increasingly tougher on taxpayers, which
has been accomplished largely by narrowing the reasonable cause defense
and other defenses available for these penalties.
1.

Valuation Misstatement Penalty

The first of these tax shelter penalties was added to the Internal
Revenue Code in 1981, when Congress introduced a valuation
misstatement penalty to address the “500,000 tax disputes outstanding
which involve property valuation questions of more than routine
significance.”19 Because Congress concluded that taxpayers had been
encouraged to overvalue certain types of property, and because valuation of
unique property is so difficult, the new penalty imposed a “bright line” test
for significant overvaluations.20 Although neither the statute nor the
legislative history of the valuation misstatement penalty uses the phrase
“tax shelter,” both commentators and courts have viewed the penalty as a
direct response to the tax shelter problem.21
The current valuation misstatement penalty provides for a 20 percent
position, including a position that resulted from participation in a tax shelter. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (West 2010) (20 percent penalty on an underpayment of tax attributable
to negligence or disregard of rules and regulations).
18. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
19. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 243 (1981). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 722, 95 Stat. 172, 341, added new § 6659 to the Internal Revenue
Code. I.R.C. § 6659 was repealed by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, which included the valuation misstatement penalty in current
I.R.C. § 6662.
20. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 243.
21. See, e.g., McCrary v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 827, 863 (1989) (Gerber, J.,
dissenting) (“Valuation is one of the major devices used in abusive tax shelters. It is the
value inherent in an asset that will imbue a transaction with economic substance.”); Rose v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 425 (1987), aff’d, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that
Congress‟s intent that penalties be applied in tax shelter cases is “particularly true to the
extent that tax motivated transactions . . . include „any valuation overstatement‟”); Kathleen
O. Lier, The Evolution in Tax Shelter Litigation: The Tax Court Closes the Door on Generic
Tax Shelters, But a Window Remains Open with Respect to the Additions to Tax and the
Increased Interest Under I.R.C. § 6621(C), 36 LOY. L. REV. 275, 276 (1990) (noting that
Congress responded to the significant backlog in the courts due to tax shelter cases);
Richard J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties: A Question of Values, 76 IOWA L. REV. 309,
310 (1991) (noting the valuation provisions were historically a battle against tax shelters).
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penalty on the portion of the underpayment of tax attributable to a
substantial valuation misstatement and a 40 percent penalty on the
underpayment attributable to a gross valuation misstatement.22
A
substantial valuation misstatement results when the value or basis of
property claimed on a return is 150 percent or more of the correct value,23
and a gross valuation misstatement results when the claimed value is 200
percent or more of the correct value.24 When the correct value or basis of
property is zero, any amount claimed on a return with respect to the value
of such property will result in a gross valuation misstatement.25 A
taxpayer‟s only defense against a valuation misstatement penalty is a
showing that she acted with reasonable cause and in good faith.26
2.

Substantial Understatement Penalty with Tax Shelter Carve Out

Shortly after the valuation misstatement penalty was enacted in 1981,
the substantial understatement penalty was added to the roster.27 An
understatement on a taxpayer‟s return generally refers to the excess of the
amount of tax required to be shown on the return over the amount of tax
actually shown on the return.28 A substantial understatement exists if the
amount of the understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax
required to be shown on the return or $5000.29 The current substantial
22. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(3), (h)(1) (West 2010). An “underpayment” means the amount by
which the correct tax exceeds the amount shown on the taxpayer‟s return plus any amounts
not shown on the return that were previously assessed or collected. Treas. Reg. § 1.66642(a) (2007). For example, amounts previously withheld but not reflected on a return should
reduce a taxpayer‟s underpayment.
23. I.R.C. § 6662(e)(1)(A) (West 2010).
24. I.R.C. § 6662(h)(2)(A)(i) (West 2010).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g) (1992). This regulation has not been amended to reflect
amendments to I.R.C. § 6662(h) in 2006, which changed the threshold for a gross valuation
misstatement from 400 percent to 200 percent. See P.L. 109-280, § 1219(a)(2)(A) (2006)
(amending the definition of gross valuation misstatement in 6662(h)(2)(A)).
26. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2010). The determination of whether a taxpayer acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith is based on an evaluation of all of the facts and
circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2003). The most important factor is the extent of
the taxpayer‟s efforts to assess her proper tax liability. Id. Circumstances that may indicate
reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is
reasonable in light of the taxpayer‟s experience, knowledge, and education, or reliance on
the advice of a professional if such reliance was reasonable under the circumstances and the
taxpayer acted in good faith. Id. There are additional requirements for valuation
misstatements relating to charitable deductions. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2) (West 2010).
27. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(adding new I.R.C. § 6661). I.R.C. § 6661 was repealed by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, and the substantial understatement penalty
was combined with the valuation misstatement penalty in current I.R.C. § 6662.
28. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(A) (West 2010).
29. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1) (West 2010).
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understatement penalty, for both tax shelter and non-tax shelter
transactions, is 20 percent of the underpayment attributable to the
substantial understatement.30
The substantial understatement penalty was originally enacted to
reduce taxpayer incentives to take questionable return positions that, if not
rising to the level of fraud or negligence, subjected taxpayers to nothing
more than tax and interest if successfully challenged on audit.31 Although
taxpayers could generally avoid the new substantial understatement penalty
by either disclosing the transaction or having substantial authority for their
positions,32 the disclosure exception was not available for tax shelter
transactions. A “tax shelter” was originally defined as an item arising from
“a partnership or other entity, plan[,] or arrangement[,] the principal
purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax.”33
Under the originally enacted substantial understatement rules,
taxpayers engaged in tax shelters needed to demonstrate both substantial
authority for their position and a reasonable belief that the treatment
claimed was more likely than not the proper treatment.34 With respect to
these more stringent requirements for tax shelters, Congress explained that
“if the principal purpose of a transaction is the reduction of tax, it is not
unreasonable to hold participants to a higher standard than ordinary
taxpayers.”35
The provision was amended in 1994 to remove the substantial
authority and reasonable belief excuse for corporate taxpayers engaged in

30. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(2) (West 2010).
31. S. REP. NO. 97-494(I), at 222-223 (1982).
32. Former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B). Under the current substantial understatement rules
for non-tax shelter transactions, a taxpayer can avoid the penalty by showing: (1) she had a
reasonable basis for her position and the position was disclosed; (2) she had substantial
authority for her position; or (3) she acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. I.R.C.
§§ 6662(d)(2)(B) and 6664(c)(1) (West 2010).
To have a reasonable basis, a return position must be more than arguable. Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3(b)(3) (2003). A return position reasonably based on the Internal Revenue Code,
Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, tax treaties, legislative history, private rulings, or
other authorities listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (2003) is generally treated as
having a reasonable basis, even if it does not meet the substantial authority standard. Id.
The substantial authority standard is less stringent than the more likely than not standard
(requiring more than a 50 percent likelihood of success), but more stringent than the
reasonable basis standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2003). Whether there is
substantial authority for a return position must be determined by weighing the relevant
authorities supporting the treatment against the authorities supporting contrary treatment.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3) (2003). Substantial authority is an objective standard and the
taxpayer‟s subjective belief is not relevant. Id.
33. H.R. CONF. REP. 97-760, at 576 (1982). See also former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(ii).
34. See former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(i).
35. H.R. CONF. REP. 97-760, at 576 (1982).
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tax shelter transactions.36 Congress further expanded the scope of the
penalty in 1997 by redefining tax shelter transactions as having “a
significant purpose” of tax avoidance, replacing the prior “principal
purpose” standard.37 Additionally, in 2004, Congress removed the
substantial authority and reasonable belief excuse for all taxpayers
participating in tax shelters.38
As it stands today, a substantial understatement with respect to a tax
shelter can be avoided by an individual taxpayer by showing that she acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith.39 In the case of a corporate
taxpayer, the penalty can be avoided only through a special, more heighted
reasonable cause and good faith requirement, which requires, at a
minimum, substantial authority and a reasonable belief that the treatment
claimed was more likely than not correct.40
3.

Reportable Transaction Understatement Penalty

Further changes were introduced to the Internal Revenue Code to
combat tax shelters with the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 (the “Jobs Act”).41 In addition to removing the substantial authority
and reasonable belief excuse from the substantial understatement penalty
for taxpayers participating in tax shelters,42 the Jobs Act created new I.R.C.
§ 6662A, which imposes an accuracy-related penalty on listed transactions
and reportable transactions with a significant tax avoidance purpose.43 A
reportable transaction is a specific type of transaction identified by
Treasury regulations as having the potential for tax avoidance or evasion.44
36. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 744(b), 108 Stat. 4809,
5011 (1994) (amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i), amended by American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004)).
37. P.L. 105-34, § 1028(c)(2) (1997), amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).
38. P.L. 108-357, § 812(d). The excuse is maintained for individuals in Treas. Reg. §
1.6664-4(g) (2003), which remains outstanding. This excuse should apply to individual
taxpayers for tax years ending before October 23, 2004, i.e., before the effective date of the
2004 amendments to I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2003).
39. I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(C), 6664(c)(1) (West 2010).
40. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2010), Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(g)(1)(ii) (2003),
1.6664-4(f) (2003). A taxpayer is considered to have a reasonable belief that the tax
treatment of an item is more likely than not correct if: (1) she concludes in good faith that
there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood her position will be upheld after a analysis of
the pertinent authorities; or (2) if the taxpayer reasonably relies in good faith on an opinion
of a tax advisor that is based on the tax advisor‟s analysis of the pertinent authorities and
concludes that there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood that the taxpayer‟s position
would be upheld. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2003).
41. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
42. Id. at § 812(d), 118 Stat. at 1580. See also text accompanying note 39.
43. Id. at § 812(a), 118 Stat. at 1577-78.
44. I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(1) (West 2010). Reportable transactions are defined
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A listed transaction, which is a type of reportable transaction, has been
specifically identified by an IRS publication as a tax avoidance
transaction.45
The reportable transaction understatement penalty is equal to 20
percent of the reportable transaction understatement for a disclosed
transaction,46 and 30 percent of the reportable transaction understatement
for an undisclosed transaction.47 The reportable transaction understatement
is generally determined by multiplying the increase in taxable income
imposed upon the taxpayer from applying the proper tax treatment times
the highest rate of tax applicable to the taxpayer.48
The legislative history of I.R.C. § 6662A provides that “[b]ecause
disclosure is so vital to combating abusive tax-avoidance transactions . . .
the Committee believes that a more meaningful (but not strict liability)
accuracy-related penalty should apply to such transactions even when
disclosed.”49 The only excuse to the reportable transaction understatement
penalty is a strengthened reasonable cause and good faith defense, which,
at a minimum, requires disclosure of the transaction, substantial authority,
and a reasonable belief that the claimed treatment was more likely than not
correct.50 Although the stated purpose of I.R.C. § 6662A was to replace the
current rules applicable to tax shelters with a new penalty,51 the substantial
understatement and valuation misstatement rules of I.R.C. § 6662 have
been left intact.
B.

The Application of Accuracy-Related Penalties in Economic
Substance Doctrine Cases

A brief overview of the economic substance doctrine is in order to
understand the context of the recently enacted penalty legislation at issue in
this Article, which flows from Congressional efforts to codify the economic
substance doctrine. Additionally, an examination of how the current
penalty regime has been applied to transactions that lack economic
in Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (2010), and include listed transactions, confidential
transactions, transactions with contractual protection, loss transactions, and transactions that
have been specifically identified by the IRS as transactions of interest. Taxpayers that have
participated in reportable transactions must report the transaction on IRS Form 8886,
Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a), (e) (2010).
45. I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(2) (West 2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2010).
46. I.R.C. § 6662A(a) (West 2010).
47. I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (West 2010).
48. I.R.C. § 6662A(b) (West 2010).
49. H.R. REP. NO. 108-393, at 183 (2003).
50. See I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010). There is no reasonable cause exception if the
transaction is undisclosed.
51. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-393, at 183 (noting that the provision replaces “the rules
applicable to tax shelters with a new accuracy-related penalty.”).
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substance in the absence of a special penalty provision sets the stage for my
argument that an additional economic substance penalty is unnecessary and
creates undue complexity within the current penalty regime.
1.

Overview of the Economic Substance Doctrine

The economic substance doctrine has been developed by courts as a
means of disregarding "transactions that comply with the literal terms of
the tax law but lack economic reality."52 Over time, the doctrine has
evolved into having two components: (1) an objective prong, requiring a
transaction to have economic substance (generally reflected in a realistic
possibility of profit or a change in the taxpayer‟s financial position); and
(2) a subjective prong, requiring a valid business purpose apart from tax
avoidance.53
Before the doctrine was codified, there was some
disagreement among the federal circuit courts as to whether a taxpayer
must satisfy both prongs to satisfy the economic substance doctrine, or if
satisfaction of one prong is sufficient.54 However, it was always clear that
a transaction that lacks both a non-tax business purpose and objective
economic substance can be disregarded by courts under the economic
52. Coltec Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 454 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also
Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. U.S., 568 F.3d 537, 543 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Coltec and
explaining the economic substance doctrine).
The origin of the doctrine can be traced to a line of Supreme Court decisions beginning
with Gregory v. Helvering, in which the Court disregarded a transaction, even though it
technically complied with the relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions, because it was
undertaken solely to avoid a tax on a distribution from the taxpayer‟s wholly owned
corporation. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See also Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1352 (describing the origin
of economic substance doctrine). Subsequently, in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, the
Supreme Court announced that a taxpayer‟s chosen form will be respected where “there is a
genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless
labels attached . . . .” 435 U.S. 561, 583-584 (1978).
53. See, e.g., Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1355-56 (describing the subjective and objective
aspects of the economic substance doctrine); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 544
(requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate two prongs); ACM P‟ship v. Commissioner, 157
F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (utilizing both subjective and objective prongs); Rice's Toyota
World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring a legitimate
business purpose or economic substance).
54. Compare Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 544 (adopting the majority view
that lack of economic substance alone is enough to invalidate a transaction), and Coltec, 454
F.3d at 1355 (same) with Rice’s Toyota, 752 F.2d at 91-92 (requiring both a lack of
objective economic substance and a valid business purpose for transaction to be
disregarded). The Third Circuit has taken the view that the subjective and objective tests
“do not constitute discrete prongs of a „rigid two-step analysis,‟ but rather represent related
factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient
substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.” ACM P’ship,
157 F.3d at 247.

456

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 13:2

substance doctrine.
2.

Penalizing Violations of Economic Substance Under the Current
Regime

Before the separate economic substance penalty was signed into law,
the IRS was presented with a variety of choices from the current accuracyrelated penalty regime when confronting a transaction that lacked economic
substance. The government most frequently asserts that the gross valuation
misstatement penalty applies in economic substance doctrine cases.55 The
substantial understatement penalty has also been asserted in the alternative,
although the accuracy-related penalties of I.R.C. § 6662 cannot be applied
cumulatively, nor can they be combined with the reportable transaction
understatement penalty under I.R.C. § 6662A.56
a.

Application of Gross Valuation Misstatement Penalty by
Courts

There is a split among the federal circuit courts as to whether the gross
valuation misstatement penalty applies to violations of the economic
substance doctrine. Courts in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits have held that when an understatement stems from deductions that
are disallowed due to a lack of economic substance, the deficiency is
attributable to an overstatement of value and the penalty applies.57 On the
55. See, e.g., Keller v. Comm‟r, 556 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming a 20 percent
negligence penalty arising from a cattle-breeding tax shelter but declining to uphold the
IRS‟s assertion of a gross valuation misstatement penalty); Long Term Capital Holdings v.
U.S., 330 F.Supp.2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004) (sustaining the IRS determinations of 40 percent
gross valuation misstatement and 20 percent substantial understatement penalties related to
capital losses arising from the unwinding of the Long Term Capital Management portfolio),
aff’d 2005-2 USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005); Clearmeadow Investments v. U.S., 87 Fed. Cl.
509 (2009) (holding that gross valuation overstatement penalties applied while disallowing
loss deductions from a tax shelter known as “Son of BOSS”).
56. See I.R.C. § 6662(b) (West 2010) (flush language), I.R.C. § 6662A(e)(2)(B) (West
2010), Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c). However, the amount of the reportable transaction
understatement is included when determining whether a taxpayer‟s understatement is
“substantial” for purposes of I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1). I.R.C. § 6662A(e)(1).
57. See Merino v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 147, 158-159 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying
valuation overstatement penalty where overvaluation of the property was “an essential
component of the tax avoidance scheme”); Zfass v. Commissioner, 118 F.3d 184, 191 (4th
Cir. 1997) (affirming valuation overstatement penalty stemming from excessive deductions
that were disallowed due to a lack of economic substance); Illes v. Commissioner, 982 F.2d
163, 167 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying the valuation misstatement penalty when a transaction
lacked economic substance); Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1991)
(affirming Tax Court's penalty imposition and citing Massengill); Massengill v. Comm‟r,
876 F.2d 616, 619-620 (8th Cir. 1989) (opining that “[w]hen an underpayment stems from
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other side of the divide, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have taken the position
that when a deduction is denied because a transaction lacks economic
substance, a valuation misstatement penalty may not be imposed because
the understatement is attributable to an invalid deduction, rather than the
overvaluation of an asset.58 The majority view is also the position taken by
the IRS,59 so taxpayers who are not fortunate enough to reside within the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits will likely continue to face the gross valuation
misstatement penalty in economic substance doctrine cases.
b.

Application of Other Penalties by Courts

The 40 percent rate on gross valuation misstatements makes it a more
attractive alternative to the substantial understatement penalty.60 It is not
surprising, then, that if accuracy-related penalties are asserted at all in an
economic substance doctrine case, the gross valuation misstatement penalty
is almost always asserted, with substantial understatement and negligence

disallowed depreciation deductions or investment credit due to lack of economic substance,
the deficiency is attributable to overstatement of value, and subject to penalty under section
6659.”) (internal citation omitted).
This position has also been adopted by the Court of Federal Claims and the Tax Court,
when not constrained. See Clearmeadow Investments, 87 Fed. Cl. 509, at 535-536 (rejecting
the idea that section 6662 permits avoidance of penalties due to a lack of economic
substance); Petaluma FX Partners v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008) (applying valuation
misstatement penalties in a final partnership administrative adjustment [FPAA] case despite
a lack of economic substance), rev’d on other grounds, 591 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(appealable to D.C. Circuit, which has not decided the issue); and Palm Canyon X
Investments v. Comm‟r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009) (applying gross valuation
misstatement penalty arising from a transaction disallowed under the economic substance
doctrine) (appealable to D.C. Circuit). The Tax Court will follow the decision of the Court
of Appeals to which a case is appealable if the Court of Appeals has already decided the
issue. See Golsen v. Comm‟r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971)
(stating that “better judicial administration requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision
which is squarely on point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals and
to that court alone.”) (footnotes omitted).
58. See Keller, 556 F.3d 1056, at 1061 (relying on Gainer as binding precedent and
rejecting the Tax Court‟s imposition of gross valuation misstatement penalty); Gainer v.
Commissioner, 893 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1990) (relying on congressional intent to reject
Commissioner's assertion of valuation overstatement penalty); Heasley v. Commissioner,
902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1990) (analogizing to Todd to reject assessment of valuation
overstatement penalty); Todd v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
valuation overstatement penalty finding that the valuation overstatement did not create tax
benefits that changed the amount of tax owed).
59. See, e.g., Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98 (providing an example of when a gross
valuation misstatement penalty would be imposed as a result of an invalid deduction).
60. However, taxpayer defenses are more limited in the case of a substantial
understatement with respect to a tax shelter. See supra notes 26, 39-40 and accompanying
text.
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penalties frequently asserted as alternatives.61
There have not yet been any economic substance doctrine cases
involving the application of the reportable transaction understatement
penalty. This is also unsurprising, since the penalty is effective only for tax
years ending after October 22, 2004,62 and the judicial decisions on
economic substance generally come out a number of years after the
transaction at issue.63
In some economic substance doctrine cases, courts have rejected the
government‟s assertion of any penalties, despite the government‟s success
on the merits, finding that the taxpayer satisfied one of the applicable
defenses, such as reasonable cause and good faith.64 Finally, there are a
number of economic substance doctrine cases that do not address the issue
of penalties at all.65
61. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund., 568 F.3d at 546 n.3 (reviewing § 6662
penalties asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross valuation misstatement,
substantial understatement of income tax, substantial valuation misstatement, and
substantial understatement of income tax.); Cemco Investors, LLC v. U.S., 2007-1 USTC
¶50,385 (reviewing § 6662 penalties asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross
valuation misstatement of adjusted basis), aff’d, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Long Term
Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F.Supp.2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004) (reviewing § 6662 penalties
asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross valuation misstatement, and as an
alternative, negligence, substantial understatement of income tax, or substantial valuation
misstatement penalties), aff’d, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005); Palm Canyon, 98
T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (reviewing Commissioner‟s assertions of gross and substantial valuation
misstatements); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Comm‟r, 132 T.C. No. 9 (2009) (reviewing §
6662 penalties asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross valuation misstatement,
and as an alternative, negligence, substantial understatement of income tax, or substantial
valuation misstatement penalties); Stobie Creek Investments v. U.S., 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008)
(reviewing the same); and Jade Trading v. U.S., 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007) (reviewing the same).
But see TIFD III-E Inc. v. U.S., 660 F.Supp.2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009) (discussing, but
declining to apply, the substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters; no mention of the
gross valuation misstatement penalty).
62. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812(f), 118 Stat. 1418
(2004).
63. Even the most recent economic substance doctrine cases have involved tax years
prior to 2004. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 537 (referring to tax years
2000-2002); Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S., 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010) (referring to tax year 2002);
TIFD III-E Inc. v. U.S., 660 F.Supp.2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009) (referring to tax years 1997 and
1998); Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (referring to tax year 2001); Country Pine Fin.
v. Comm‟r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (2009) (referring to tax year 2001); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. U.S., 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009) (referring to tax year 1997); Schering-Plough v. U.S.,
651 F.Supp.2d 219 (D.N.J. 2009) (referring to tax years 1991 and 1992).
64. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. U.S., 472 F.Supp.2d 885 (E.D. Tex.
2007) (holding that the gross valuation misstatement penalty did not apply to violations of
economic substance; and taxpayer satisfied substantial authority and reasonable belief that
treatment was more likely than not correct defense for substantial understatement penalty
for a tax shelter transaction), aff’d, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009).
65. See, e.g., Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1352 (failing to discuss penalties); ACM P’ship, 157
F.3d at 231 (stating that the IRS did not assert penalties); Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. 35
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IRS’s Position on Penalties in Economic Substance Doctrine
Cases

The IRS has taken the position that the reportable transaction
understatement penalty, the substantial understatement penalty with respect
to a tax shelter, the negligence penalty, and the gross valuation
misstatement penalty all may apply to a transaction that lacks economic
substance.66 In informal guidance, the IRS has also indicated a preference
for the gross valuation misstatement penalty or the reportable transaction
understatement penalty, when they apply.67
III. A NEW PENALTY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
DOCTRINE
As a result of the disagreement among courts as to whether the
economic substance doctrine requires a taxpayer to demonstrate both
objective economic substance and a subjective business purpose,68 and in
light of the uncertainty as to how to apply both the objective and subjective
tests, legislation codifying the economic substance doctrine was signed into
law on March 30, 2010.69 The new legislation “clarifies that the economic
substance doctrine involves a conjunctive analysis—there must be an
inquiry regarding the objective effects of the transaction on the taxpayer‟s
economic position as well as an inquiry regarding the taxpayer‟s subjective
motives for engaging in the transaction.”70 Although the codification of the
(stating that the IRS did not assert penalties); Consolidated Edison Co. v. U.S., 90 Fed. Cl.
228 (2009) (stating that the IRS did not discuss penalties); Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M.
(CCH) 410 (stating that the IRS did not assert penalties).
66. E.g., Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98; Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730. The IRS
takes the position that these penalties apply in the alternative. See supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
67. See IRS Chief Counsel Advice, No. 200923042 (June 5, 2009) (suggesting that §
6662A should be the primary penalty).
68. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 544 (stating that the law
regarding whether the economic substance doctrine requires a taxpayer to demonstrate both
objective economic substance and a subjective business purpose is split with the majority
requiring only one prong to be lacking to invalidate a transaction); Coltec, 454 F.3d at 135556 (finding that the lack of economic substance is sufficient to invalidate a transaction
regardless of motive); ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 247 (explaining that the objective and
subjective elements do not constitute discrete prongs of a two-step analysis, but rather are
related factors which should be taken into account to determine whether the transaction had
sufficient substance for tax purposes); Rice‟s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d
89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming that Frank Lyon Co. v. United States requires both prongs
to be taken into account when determining whether the transaction is a sham).
69. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong.
§ 1409 (2010) (adding new I.R.C. § 7701(o)).
70. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-18-10, S. DOC. 2010-6147, TECHNICAL
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economic substance doctrine is intended to provide “a uniform definition of
economic substance,” it is not intended to alter the flexibility of courts in
other respects, including a court‟s determination of when the doctrine is
relevant to a particular transaction.71
In addition to specifying that a conjunctive test is required, the
legislation clarifies the requirements for both the objective and subjective
prongs of the doctrine72 and provides other special rules such as those for
determining whether a transaction has profit potential.73 The bill adds new
I.R.C. § 7701(o), which states that a transaction shall be treated as having
economic substance only if it changes the taxpayer‟s economic position in
a meaningful way (apart from tax effects) and the taxpayer has a substantial
purpose (apart from tax reasons) for entering into such transaction.74
Additionally, the recently enacted legislation contains a provision for
a separate, new strict liability penalty for violations of the economic
substance doctrine.75 Legislative history surrounding the penalty provision
is relatively sparse. Although Congress has made it clear that the penalty is
intended to deter abusive tax shelters,76 neither Congress nor the Joint
Committee on Taxation (which has offered a number of technical
explanations of the various proposals to codify the economic substance
doctrine77) has offered insight as to why strict liability is now being
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010” 153
(Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter JCX-18-10]. See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX11-10, S. DOC. 2010-5371, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE “AMERICAN WORKERS, STATE AND BUSINESS RELIEF ACT OF 2010,”
(Comm. Print 2010) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter JCX-11-10]; JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-09, S. DOC. 2009-24413, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 3962, THE “AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR
AMERICA ACT OF 2009” 89-90 (Comm. Print 2009) (as amended Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter
JCX-47-09] (noting that the new legislation clarifies and enhances the doctrine by providing
a uniform definition of economic substance).
71. JCX-18-10, supra note 70, at 152; JCX-11-10, supra note 70, at 189; JCX-47-09,
supra note 70, at 90. See also H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“[T]he
provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule
of law . . . .”).
Much has been written about the wisdom (or lack thereof) of codifying the economic
substance doctrine, an issue which is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Monte
Jackel, Farming for Economic Substance: Codification Fails to Bear Fruit, 119 TAX NOTES
59 (2008); Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389
(2010); Mark J. Silverman & Amanda P. Varma, The Future of Tax Planning: From Coltec
to Schering-Plough, 126 TAX NOTES 341 (2010); Dennis Ventry, Save the Economic
Substance Doctrine From Congress, 118 TAX NOTES 1405 (2008).
72. H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A),(B).
73. Id. at § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2).
74. Id. at § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1).
75. Id. at § 1409(b).
76. See infra Part III.B.1.
77. See JCX-18-10, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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imposed in the context of the economic substance doctrine.
A.

The New Economic Substance Penalty

The new legislation amends I.R.C. § 6662 to provide for a twenty
percent penalty for disclosed transactions that lack economic substance and
a forty percent penalty for “nondisclosed noneconomic substance
transactions.”78 The penalty covers “[a]ny disallowance of claimed tax
benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance . . . or
failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.”79 The statute
does not define what is meant by “any similar rule of law.” The legislative
history however, states that the penalty is intended to apply to a transaction
that is disregarded as a result of the application of the same factors as those
used in an economic substance analysis, even if a term other than the
“economic substance doctrine” is used.80
The new penalty legislation also provides for strict liability,
accomplished by amending I.R.C. § 6664(c) to eliminate the reasonable
cause and good faith defense for any transaction lacking economic
substance.81 Additionally, the bill eliminates the special reasonable cause
and good faith defense for reportable transaction understatements82 for any
portion of the reportable transaction understatement that is attributable to a
transaction that lacks economic substance. There is no corresponding
provision to eliminate the reasonable cause and good faith defense for
reportable transaction understatements attributable to tax shelters, nor does
the bill eliminate that defense for substantial understatements with respect
to tax shelters.83
The final result on the strict liability front after the enactment of H.R.
7872 is the following:
Any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a
78. See H.R. 4872, § 1409(b)(1-3) (adding new I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6) and 6662(i)). The
legislation clarifies that the new penalty cannot be combined with other accuracy-related
penalties.
79. Id.
80. JCX-18-10, supra note 70, at 155 n. 359. The “any similar rule of law” language
introduces additional uncertainty as to the proper application of the penalty, the discussion
of which is beyond the scope of this Article. For example, it is unclear if the “step
transaction” or “sham” doctrines would constitute a similar rule of law. Silverman &
Varma, supra note 71, at 357 (noting the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a similar rule
of law and proposing that such language be removed from the statute).
81. H.R. 4872, § 1409(c)(1).
82. I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010).
83. H.R. 4872, § 1409(c)(2). Additionally, the new legislation provides that an
excessive claim for a refund which is attributable to a transaction that lacks economic
substance will be subject to the twenty percent penalty under I.R.C. § 6676(a) and the
reasonable basis exception is not available. Id. at § 1409(d).
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transaction lacking economic substance within the meaning of
new I.R.C. § 7701(o) is subject to strict liability.
A gross valuation misstatement penalty is still subject to the
regular reasonable cause and good faith defense.
A substantial understatement with respect to a tax shelter is
still subject to the same heightened reasonable cause and good
faith defense.
A reportable transaction understatement is still subject to the
same heightened reasonable cause and good faith defense, unless
the tax benefits are disallowed because the transaction lacks
economic substance (in which case strict liability applies).
B.

Reactions to the New Strict Liability Penalty

Congress has advanced a number of justifications for the new strict
liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine. These
arguments focus mainly on deterrence and the inherent disadvantage to the
IRS in economic substance doctrine cases due to the complexity of the
transactions. On the other side of the debate, many tax scholars and
practitioners have vigorously opposed the new strict liability penalty.
1.

Arguments in Favor of a Strict Liability Penalty

a. Deterrence
The Senate Finance Committee has reasoned that a stronger penalty
imposed on transactions that lack economic substance will deter taxpayers
from entering into such transactions and thus promote compliance.84 It has
also been suggested that a harsher penalty is justified in this context
because the lack of IRS resources to litigate cases may lead to settlements
that are not sufficiently detrimental to taxpayers to deter them from
entering into transactions that lack economic substance.85
Proponents also point out that, under the current penalty regime, a
taxpayer may completely avoid penalties and pay nothing but the tax owed
plus interest if the taxpayer obtains an opinion from an advisor that
concludes the position is more likely than not to prevail.86 As a result,
members of Congress have argued that a strict liability penalty “level[s] the
playing field” between more aggressive and more conservative tax planners
by forcing planners and taxpayers to focus on the potential downside if

84. Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-206, at
114 (2007).
85. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 63.
86. Id. at n. 201.
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their position is not sustained on the merits.87 It has also been suggested
that the strict liability penalty further “adds to the IRS‟s existing deterrence
abilities” because it would apply both to transactions that would fall under
the current definition of reportable transactions, and to transactions that
have not yet been identified as abusive by the IRS.88
The deterrence argument has accompanied the enactment of all of the
tax shelter penalties, and it doesn‟t appear that anything new has been
offered in the case of the economic substance penalty. For example, the
argument that taxpayers who successfully avoid penalties end up paying
nothing more than tax and interest, and therefore have no motivation to
avoid abusive transactions, was advanced in the early 1980s when the
substantial understatement penalty was enacted.89
The arguments
supporting the new economic substance penalty fail to explain whether a
stronger penalty is now needed because the current accuracy-related
penalties have failed to adequately deter taxpayers from participating in tax
shelters. If that is the case, then it appears a complete overhaul of the
accuracy-related penalty regime may be in order. If that is not the case,
then proponents have failed to explain why the deterrence needs for
violations of the economic substance doctrine are unique vis-à-vis
transactions covered by other tax shelter penalties.90
b.

Complexity

Those in favor of the strict liability penalty have also asserted that
economic substance doctrine cases often involve complex, “highly
structured” transactions, where the taxpayer is the only party with access to
and an understanding of all of the facts.91 These cases often turn on
extensive expert testimony or discovery on issues such as the profit
potential of a specific transaction.92 It has thus been argued that “such
structured transactions are appropriately subject to a strict liability penalty
that cannot be avoided by the presence of a tax opinion.”93 Additionally,

87. Id. at n. 202 (statement of Samuel Thomson, Jr., before the Subcommittee on Select
Revenue Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means, May 9, 2006).
88. Id. at 68.
89. See S. REP. NO. 97-494(i), supra note 31, at 223 (noting that existing law did not
adequately deter abusive transactions since the only penalties were tax and interest).
90. One commentator has argued that creating a harsher penalty for violations of the
economic substance doctrine does not necessarily deter tax shelters more effectively, “as [a]
taxpayer may still hedge his bets” that he will win his claim on the merits. Mik Shin-Li,
Strictly Wrong as a Tax Policy: The Strict Liability Standard in Noneconomic Substance
Transactions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2046 (2010).
91. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64, 68.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 65.
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proponents of the penalty have pointed out that, in applying the current
accuracy-related penalties for reportable transactions, “there is little
experience to date as to how the „strengthened reasonable cause‟
requirements will be applied to particular facts” in these complex economic
substance doctrine cases.94
The complex transactions argument is reminiscent of the argument
that a bright line penalty was needed to address the difficult and factintensive valuation issues of “more than routine significance” that preceded
the enactment of the valuation misstatement penalty.95 Like the deterrence
argument, the argument that highly structured transactions are
appropriately subject to strict liability fails to differentiate between
transactions that are found to fail the economic substance doctrine and
equally complex (or identical) transactions that might be found to violate a
substantive provision of the Internal Revenue Code.96 Modern day tax
shelters are almost universally complex, and if complexity is hindering the
IRS‟s ability to successfully litigate tax shelter cases, this again calls for
broader changes to the entire accuracy-penalty regime, rather than a special
rule that would only aid the IRS in cases where the transaction is
disallowed due to the economic substance doctrine.
Proponents are correct in noting that there is “little experience to date”
as to how the strengthened reasonable cause requirements enacted in 2004
will play out in tax shelter cases, since the economic substance doctrine
cases to date have generally involved tax years prior to 2004.97 However,
the fact that there has not been time to adequately study the effect of the
most recent tax shelter penalty legislation only highlights the fact that the
strict liability penalty is premature, and possibly unnecessary in light of the
current accuracy-related penalties.

94. Id. at 68 n. 224.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201 at 243 (1981); see also supra text accompanying note 20.
96. For example, in Maguire Partners-Master Investments, LLC v. U.S., the court held
that the taxpayer‟s tax shelter lacked economic substance, but that even if the economic
substance doctrine did not apply, the taxpayer‟s claimed benefits were virtually eliminated
under I.R.C. § 752 or Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6. No. CV 06-07371-JFW(RZx), 2009 WL
4907033, at *17-19 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009).
97. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64, 68. To date, no economic substance doctrine cases
have involved the reportable transaction understatement penalty, which is effective only for
tax years ending after October 22, 2004. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-357, § 812(f), 118 Stat. 1418, 1580. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at
537 (tax years 2000-2002); Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (tax year 2002); Palm Canyon, 98
T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (tax year 2001); Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (tax year
2001); Consolidated Edison Co. v. U.S., 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009) (tax year 1997); TIFD III-E
Inc. v. U.S., 660 F.Supp.2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009) (tax years 1997 and 1998); ScheringPlough, 651 F.Supp.2d 219 (tax years 1991 and 1992); see also supra text accompanying
note 64.
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Arguments Against a Strict Liability Penalty

a. Fairness
Despite the justifications proffered by legislators, the strict liability
penalty has been roundly criticized by scholars and practitioners alike for
being unfair and disproportionate.98 What has been described as the “most
obvious” argument against strict liability is that it unfairly punishes
taxpayers who have made good faith attempts to comply with the law. The
absence of a reasonable cause exception prohibits these taxpayers from
introducing evidence of any mitigating circumstances that might otherwise
lead a court or the IRS to conclude that the penalty should not apply.99
Additionally, many opponents of the penalty have argued that strict
liability is particularly unfair and inappropriate in the context of the
economic substance doctrine. Whereas strict liability may be appropriate
in certain narrow, clearly defined situations, commentators have noted that
application of the economic substance doctrine involves a great deal of
ambiguity, such as how to define the objective and subjective prongs, and
when application of the doctrine is even relevant.100 Indeed, the doctrine
applies even when the substantive provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
which more clearly define taxpayer behavior, do not apply to a transaction.

98. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, New York State Bar Association Submits Comments on
Modifications to House Healthcare Bill, 2009 TNT 182-25 (Sept. 22, 2009) (LEXIS)
[hereinafter NY Bar Submits Comments] (citing Letter from Erika W. Nijenhuis, Chair,
New York State Bar Association, to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Baucus and
Ranking Member Grassley and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rangel and
Ranking Member Camp (Sept. 22, 2009)); Tax Analysts, AICPA Calls for Reform of Civil
Tax Penalty System, 2009 TNT 166-76 (Aug. 31, 2009) (LEXIS) (citing AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES: THE NEED
FOR REFORM (Aug. 28, 2009)) [hereinafter REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES]; Tax Analysts,
ABA Tax Section Comments on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, 2007 TNT
72-22 (Apr. 12, 2007) (LEXIS) (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION,
PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE (Apr. 12, 2007))
[hereinafter ABA Proposed Codification]; Lawrence M. Hill & Alexandra Minkovich, Tax
Policy Gone Wild: Harsh Penalties as Revenue Raisers, 115 TAX NOTES 79 (2007); David
S. Miller, An Alternative to Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 123 TAX
NOTES 747 (2009); Silverman & Varma, supra note 71; Clinton Stretch et al., Economic
Substance and Strict Liability Do Not Mix, 123 TAX NOTES 1357 (2009).
99. Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1359.
100. See, e.g., ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at 10; REPORT ON CIVIL TAX
PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 3, 7; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 81; Stretch et al.,
supra note 98, at 1360. For example, it has been noted that the proposal to apply the penalty
to violations of the economic substance doctrine or “any similar rule of law” exacerbates
this inherent ambiguity. ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at 11; see also supra
text accompanying note 70; supra text accompanying note 80.

466

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

a.

[Vol. 13:2

Adverse Effects on Taxpayer Behavior

Other opponents have pointed out potential adverse effects on
taxpayer behavior, suggesting that the severity of the penalty may overdeter taxpayers and cause them to avoid legitimate transactions.101 A
taxpayer with a legally defensible position may ultimately decide to
abandon a business transaction for fear of being automatically subjected to
a strict liability penalty if the IRS asserts that the economic substance
doctrine is applicable.102
It has further been argued that the strict liability aspect of the penalty
may actually discourage taxpayers from disclosing transactions, making it
harder for the IRS to detect tax shelters.103 Aggressive taxpayers may
determine that the benefit from disclosure, i.e. a reduction in the penalty
rate from 40 percent to 20 percent, is too small of a benefit compared to the
potential benefit of avoiding detection, and thus a penalty, altogether.104
Opponents also argue that the severity of the penalty may lead to
increased taxpayer incentives to litigate when the IRS raises the economic
substance doctrine, which in turn burdens IRS and judicial resources.105
Since the taxpayer will be subject to the penalty in every case in which it
concedes, there is little incentive not to challenge the case on substantive
grounds.106
b.

Enforcement Issues

Others fear that courts might be reluctant to impose the penalty due to
its severity and, thus, may be reluctant to find that economic substance is
lacking in cases where the doctrine is appropriate.107 The IRS has also
criticized the legislation for creating a penalty that will be difficult to
enforce,108 and it has been suggested that the administration of the new

101. E.g., JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 81; Stretch
et al., supra note 98, at 1361-62.
102. Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1362. For example, it has been argued that
taxpayers may be improperly deterred from commonly accepted tax planning choices, such
as the choice to do business through a partnership. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 65.
103. Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 81.
104. ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at 12.
105. E.g., JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64; ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at
11; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 82; Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1359.
106. Id.
107. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64-65, 67; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 80;
Miller, supra note 98, at 748; Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1359.
108. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, Korb Notes Declining Revenue Estimate for Economic
Substance Codification, 2007 TNT 212-6 (Nov. 1, 2007) (LEXIS) [hereinafter Tax Analysts
I].
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penalty would be a drain on IRS resources.109
a.

Motivated by Revenue

Finally, some commentators have also suggested that despite the
deterrence rationale offered by Congress, the true motivation behind
codification of the economic substance doctrine and the strict liability
penalty is to raise revenue, which is often viewed as “an unsatisfactory
rationale” 110 for penalty legislation.111 It has been suggested that one of the
main reasons Congress continued to include proposals to codify the
economic substance doctrine in its bills was to help pay for them.112 The
Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that codification of the economic
substance doctrine would raise revenue of $4.5 billion between 2010 and
2019.113 Although it is unclear how much of this estimate is attributable to
the strict liability penalty, it is logical to assume that most of the revenue
would be derived from the new penalty, since the legislation otherwise
merely codified an existing judicial doctrine that the IRS already had at its
disposal.114

109. ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98 at 11; Stretch et al., supra note 98 at
1359.
110. Hill and Minkovich, supra note 98, at 79.
111. REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 1, 4; Stretch et al., supra note
98, at 1361; Ventry, supra note 71, at 1410. The IRS‟s Penalty Handbook also states that
while penalties do bring additional revenues into the Treasury, these results are “not reasons
for creating or imposing penalties.” INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 20.1.1.2 (Feb. 22,
2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-001r.html#d0e406.
112. Donald L. Korb, Codification of the Judicial Economic Substance Doctrine, 852
PLI/TAX 377, 395 (2008).
113. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-17-10, ESTIMATED REVENUE
EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4872, THE
“RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010” (as amended) (Comm. Print 2010), available at
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3672. The revenue estimates for
codification of the economic substance doctrine have been steadily declining. In 2009, the
estimate was approximately $7 billion over ten years, and in 2005 the estimate was
approximately $16 billion over 10 years. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX28-09, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT‟S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL (Comm. Print 2009), available at
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3558;
JOINT
COMM.
ON
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-82-05, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE TAX PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN S. 2020, THE TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005 (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1533.
114. In criticizing codification for being driven by revenue concerns, then-IRS Chief
Counsel Donald Korb stated that “[a]ll the money is in the penalties.” Tax Analysts, Korb
Slams Textron Ruling, Wall Street Rule, Senate Economic Substance Bill, 2007 TNT 197-3
(Oct. 11, 2007).
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Putting the Penalty in Perspective

The most notable aspect of the economic substance penalty is that it
provides for strict liability, and this has been the focus of the commentary
surrounding the penalty. What most critiques of the legislation have not
done is stop to query whether there is any need for a separate penalty for
violations of the economic substance doctrine at all, strict liability aside.115
Part IV of this Article will explore this question and conclude that a
separate penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine is
unjustified. Part V will then explore the strict liability aspect of the penalty
and conclude that it is similarly unjustified because there is no qualitative
difference between transactions that violate the economic substance
doctrine and transactions covered by other tax shelter penalties, for which a
reasonable cause defense is available.
IV. ADDING A FOURTH ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTY TO THE CURRENT
TAX SHELTER REGIME
This part argues against a separate economic substance penalty in light
of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters. The economic substance
penalty results in substantial overlap with the other tax shelter penalties.
The current penalties have been consistently sustained by courts in
economic substance doctrine cases, obviating the need for an additional
penalty. Congress has not identified what types of transactions it intends to
capture with the new economic substance penalty that are not covered by
the current tax shelter penalties.
If the sole justification for the new penalty is strict liability, then the
same result could have been accomplished by amending the current tax
shelter penalties to remove the taxpayer defenses. Adding an economic
substance penalty to the list of tax shelter penalties creates significant and
unnecessary complexity in an already confusing penalty regime, making it
difficult for taxpayers to understand and predict the consequences of their
behavior.
A.

Overlap with Other Tax Shelter Penalties Creates Undue Complexity
Are violations of the economic substance doctrine falling through the

115. Commentators often assert that a reasonable cause exception should be added to the
proposed legislation. See, e.g., Stretch et al., supra note 98. But see REPORT ON CIVIL TAX
PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 14 (recommending a comprehensive study of current tax
shelter penalties in lieu of a strict liability penalty for violations of the economic substance
doctrine); Shin-Li, supra note 90, at 2048 (arguing that the current penalty regime is
sufficient to address the tax shelter problem).
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cracks of the current accuracy-related penalty regime, calling for a new
penalty that specifically addresses transactions that fall under the doctrine?
This is a question that does not appear to have been addressed by
legislators and other advocates of the new economic substance penalty.
1.

Past Experience Shows that the Current Penalty Regime Is
Adequate

An examination of recent cases in which courts have applied the
economic substance doctrine reveals that the government has more than
enough accuracy-related penalties at its disposal and that it has been
successful in asserting these penalties against the taxpayer in cases in
which the government prevails on the merits.
For example, out of eight economic substance doctrine cases in which
the government prevailed in 2009, penalties were sustained in four of the
cases, while the taxpayer successfully defeated penalty assertions in only
two cases.116 The government has successfully asserted penalties in a
number of high profile economic substance doctrine cases prior to 2009, as
well.117 In economic substance doctrine cases where taxpayers have
successfully fended off penalties, they generally have been able to
demonstrate reasonable cause or substantial authority.118 Except in the
cases in which courts, adopting the minority view, have determined that the
gross valuation misstatement penalty is inapplicable to violations of the
economic substance doctrine,119 courts have not held that the current
accuracy-related penalties are inapplicable to violations of the economic
substance doctrine. Further, even in the minority of economic substance
doctrine cases where the gross valuation misstatement penalty was found to

116. For cases sustaining penalties, see Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574;
Clearmeadow Investments, 87 Fed. Cl. 509; New Phoenix Sunrise Corp., 132 T.C. No. 9;
and Maguire Partners-Master Investments, 2009 WL 4907033. The taxpayer successfully
defeated penalties in Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund and Southgate Master Fund LLC v. U.S.,
651 F. Supp. 2d 596 (N.D. Tex. 2009). Additionally, in two other cases in which the
government prevailed on economic substance in 2009, penalties were not discussed or were
not asserted. Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (penalties not asserted) and
Schering-Plough, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219 (penalties not discussed).
117. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Investments LLC v. U.S., 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008); Cemco
Investors LLC v. U.S., 2007 WL 951944 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir.
2008); Long Term Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d,
2005-2 USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005).
118. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 537 (finding that taxpayer
satisfied substantial authority and reasonable belief that treatment was more likely than not a
correct defense for the substantial understatement penalty for a tax shelter transaction) and
Southgate Master Fund LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (finding that taxpayer had substantial
authority and satisfied reasonable cause and good faith).
119. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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be inapplicable, other accuracy-related penalties have been sustained in the
alternative.120 Thus, there is no indication that the current penalty regime
has been inadequate in past economic substance doctrine cases.
2.

Conceptually, the Current Penalties Should Continue to Apply

These results are not surprising, as there do not appear to be
transactions that would fall under the economic substance doctrine that are
not covered by at least one, if not all, of the other tax shelter penalties.
Many transactions that lack economic substance would constitute a gross
valuation misstatement, a tax shelter for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty, and would also constitute a reportable transaction.
a.

Gross Valuation Misstatement

When Congress enacted the valuation misstatement penalty in the
early 1980s, the typical tax shelter scheme often involved an ostensible
purchase of a depreciable asset in a transaction in which the taxpayer made
a minimal equity investment and obtained the benefit of depreciation
deductions, interest deductions, and possibly an investment tax credit.121
These transactions easily lent themselves to application of the valuation
misstatement penalty, as was intended by Congress in enacting the
penalty.122 Taxpayers relied on the basis claimed in the purchased asset for
depreciation and investment tax credits, and that basis was reduced to zero
when the ostensible sale was nullified, which automatically satisfied the
threshold for a valuation misstatement for courts taking the majority
approach.123
Although the nature of tax shelters has evolved since the 1980s, more
recent economic substance doctrine cases still tend to involve transactions
in which the taxpayer relies on an inflated basis to obtain tax benefits, often
a deductible loss.124 Given that the majority of courts and the IRS take the
position that violations of the economic substance doctrine result in a gross

120. E.g., Keller, 556 F.3d at 1056.
121. See, e.g., Massengill, 876 F.2d at 616 (denying depreciation deductions and
investment tax credit on cattle purchase and upholding valuation misstatement penalty).
122. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201 at 243.
123. E.g., Massengill, 876 F.2d at 616 and Zirker v. Comm‟r, 87 T.C. 970 (1986)
(involving the depreciation of cattle).
124. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 537 (claiming taxpayer loss
based on inflated basis in partnership interest); Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 11 (claiming
taxpayer loss based on inflated basis in partnership interest); H.J. Heinz Co. v. U.S., 76 Fed.
Cl. 570 (2007) (claiming taxpayer loss based on artificially high basis in stock of its parent);
Long Term Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 2005-2
USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005) (claiming taxpayer loss on sale of high basis preferred stock).
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valuation misstatement,125 this penalty should continue to be a powerful
weapon in tax shelter cases. This is particularly true because, unlike the
substantial understatement and reportable transaction understatement
penalties, the rate on the gross valuation misstatement penalty is 40
percent, the same as the maximum rate on the new economic substance
penalty.
b.

Substantial Understatement with Respect to a Tax Shelter

An even bigger overlap appears to exist between transactions that
violate the economic substance doctrine and transactions that meet the
broad definition of “tax shelter” for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty under I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C). Any economic
substance doctrine case will likely involve a deficiency large enough to
constitute a substantial understatement,126 and the issue would be only
whether the transaction constitutes a tax shelter under I.R.C. §
6662(d)(2)(C), such that the taxpayer‟s defenses to the penalty would be
limited.127
A tax shelter is defined for this purpose as a partnership or other
entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or
arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan or
arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.128 In the
case of the economic substance doctrine, as recently codified, a taxpayer
has violated the doctrine if the transaction lacks either objective economic
substance or a subjective business purpose.129
Under the new legislation, a court could find that a transaction failed
the economic substance doctrine solely because it lacked a business
purpose, without ever having to decide the issue of objective economic
substance. Additionally, in many cases in which a court has determined
that a transaction lacks objective substance, the court also concludes
(unsurprisingly) that the taxpayer did not have a subjective business
purpose.130 If a taxpayer‟s transaction fails the subjective prong of the
economic substance doctrine because it has no non-tax business purpose,
125. See supra notes 57 and 66 and accompanying text.
126. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1) (West 2010).
127. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2010),
6664(c)(1) (West 2010).
128. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2010).
129. H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2) (West 2010).
130. It is not surprising, for example, that a transaction resulting in negative cash flows
lacks a valid, non-tax business purpose. See, e.g., Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410.
Many economic substance doctrine cases involve transactions that fail both prongs of the
test, including the subjective prong. See, e.g., Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. 35; Palm Canyon,
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574; and Schering-Plough, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219.
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this would surely meet the lower threshold of having a “significant
purpose” of tax avoidance under I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C). Accordingly, the
substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters should pick up a large
number, if not the majority, of these cases.131
c.

Reportable Transaction Understatement

The reportable transaction understatement penalty is still untested in
the context of economic substance doctrine cases.132 However, because it
was specifically drafted to address tax shelter transactions,133 the penalty
should also cover a significant number of economic substance doctrine
cases that involve tax years ending after October 22, 2004.134 Reportable
transactions include listed transactions, confidential transactions,
transactions with contractual protection, loss transactions, and transactions
of interest.135 These categories encompass common features of tax shelter
transactions, many of which have been the subject of economic substance
doctrine cases.
For example, a “confidential transaction” is one offered to a taxpayer
under conditions of confidentiality and for which a taxpayer pays a
minimum fee to an advisor.136 This describes the taxpayer‟s arrangement in
Stobie Creek Investments v. United States, in which the Court of Federal
Claims held that the taxpayer‟s transaction lacked economic substance.137
In sustaining accuracy-related penalties in the case, the court concluded
that the reasonableness of the taxpayer‟s reliance on an opinion of counsel
was diminished because of clear conflict of interest, which was due to
“[t]he proprietary nature of the confidentiality agreements required by [the
law firm] and the calculation of the fee for its Tax Opinion based on a
percentage of the gains to be sheltered . . . .”138
Additionally, a number of economic substance doctrine cases have
constituted, and inevitably will continue to constitute, loss transactions. A
loss transaction is a transaction in which a taxpayer claims a loss under

131. On the other hand, a transaction that meets the subjective business purpose prong
but fails the objective economic substance prong would lack economic substance under the
codified rules, but would not necessarily constitute a tax shelter under the substantial
understatement rules.
132. See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.
133. H.R. REP. NO. 108-393, at 183 (2003).
134. To be subject to the reportable transaction understatement penalty under I.R.C. §
6662A, a taxpayer‟s reportable transaction must have a significant purpose of tax avoidance,
unless the transaction is a listed transaction. I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2) (West 2010).
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2010).
136. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2010).
137. 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008).
138. Id. at 715.
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I.R.C. § 165 of at least $10 million in a single year in the case of a
corporation (or partnership with corporate partners), or a loss of at least $2
million in a single year in the case of an individual.139 The stakes in
litigated economic substance doctrine cases will often meet these dollar
thresholds. Further, as discussed in the context of the valuation
misstatement penalty, recent tax shelters at issue in economic substance
doctrine cases often tend to involve transactions in which the taxpayer
claims a deductible loss under I.R.C. § 165.140 Although there is a safe
harbor under Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) that protects losses when a taxpayer
has a “qualified basis,” this safe harbor generally requires that the
taxpayer‟s basis be derived from a cash outlay by the taxpayer.141 In
contrast, most tax shelters at issue in economic substance doctrine cases
involve only a minimal equity investment by the taxpayer.142
Finally, a number of tax shelters that have been the subject of
economic substance doctrine cases are listed transactions, some of which
had already been identified by the IRS before the tax year at issue in the
case.143 This overlap between reportable transactions and tax shelters that
violate the economic substance doctrine demonstrates that the reportable
transaction understatement penalty, with its restricted taxpayer defenses,
should be an effective tool in economic substance doctrine cases going
forward.
3.

A Hypothetical Analysis of Three Recent Cases

The above analysis indicates that the current tax shelter penalties are
sufficient to cover most, if not all, economic substance doctrine cases,
making an additional economic substance penalty redundant and confusing.
This has been true historically, can be demonstrated conceptually based on
the common features of tax shelter transactions, and should continue to
play out in practice going forward. This last point can be illustrated by an
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5) (as amended in 2010).
140. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 124.
141. Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-2 C.B. 966.
142. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 541-42 (taxpayers made equity
investment of $1.5 million and claimed loss of approximately $25 million).
143. A listed transaction is a type of reportable transaction that has been specifically
identified by the IRS as a tax avoidance transaction. I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(2)
(West 2010). See, e.g., Clearmeadow Investments, 87 Fed. Cl. 509; New Phoenix Sunrise
Corp., 132 T.C. 161; Maguire Partners-Master Investments, LLC v. U.S., No. CV 0607371-JFW(RZx), 2009 WL 4907033, at *17-19 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (all involving
the same listed transaction, which was identified by the IRS in I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, cited
infra note 159). Each of the above-mentioned cases involves tax years after the issuance of
I.R.S. Notice 2000-44. See Monte A. Jackel & Robert J. Crnkovich, Son-of-BOSS Revisited,
123 TAX NOTES 1481 (2009) (surveying various cases involving Son-of-BOSS litigation that
occurred after the issuance of I.R.S. Notice 2000-44).
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examination of three recent economic substance doctrine decisions.
Although penalties were raised in only one of these cases, an examination
of the tax shelters at issue illustrates how the current penalty regime is
more than adequate.
a.

Wells Fargo: The SILO Tax Shelter

In Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims
held that the taxpayer‟s sale in/lease out (“SILO”) transaction lacked
economic substance.144 In a typical SILO transaction, the taxpayer enters
into a purported sale-leaseback transaction with a tax exempt entity, under
which the tax exempt entity sells property to the taxpayer and the taxpayer
immediately leases the property back to the tax exempt entity.145 The lease
provides for rental payments, and substantially all of the purchase price is
set aside by the tax-exempt entity to fund its lease obligations.146 The
taxpayer makes a minor equity investment and funds most of the purchase
price with nonrecourse debt, the interest deductions on which offset the
rental income it receives under the lease.147 At the end of the lease term,
the taxpayer generally has the option to either sell the property back to the
tax exempt entity at a fixed price, or to impose a service contract on the tax
exempt entity under which the taxpayer is reimbursed for its costs and is
guaranteed a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment.148
The taxpayer is generally shielded from economic risk by this arrangement,
and benefits during the lease term through taking depreciation deductions
on the property (in addition to the interest deductions on the nonrecourse
loan).149
Wells Fargo entered into a number of SILO transactions with various
public transit agencies, in which it leased depreciable assets such as rail
cars, locomotives, or buses.150 The court employed the majority test for
economic substance and held that Wells Fargo was not entitled to interest
or depreciation deductions unless it could prove its SILO transactions had

144. 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010).
145. I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, 2005-1 C.B. 630. The initial sale may be in the form of a
lease of the property with a term that is longer than the remaining useful life of the property,
which the parties treat as a sale for tax purposes. Id.
146. Id. The tax exempt entity also retains an amount that represents a fee as an
inducement to enter into the transaction.
147. Id. In reality, the interest and rental payments are often not made, but are recorded
as offsetting book entries. See Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at 39-40.
148. See supra note 145. The tax exempt entity‟s obligations are generally funded by the
equity portion of the purchase price paid by the taxpayer. See Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at
41.
149. I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, supra note 145.
150. Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at 37.
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both objective economic substance and a subjective business purpose.151
The court held the transactions lacked objective economic substance
because the only non-tax benefit Wells Fargo received was a return of its
equity investment with interest.152 The court also held that Wells Fargo
lacked a non-tax business purpose and that it wouldn‟t have entered into
the transactions but for the tax benefits.153 Accordingly, Wells Fargo‟s
transactions were found to fail the economic substance doctrine and the
related tax deductions were denied.
Penalties were not discussed in the Wells Fargo case. The case also
involved the 2002 tax year, before the effective date of the reportable
transaction understatement penalty. However, based on the facts of the
transaction alone, all of the current accuracy-related tax shelter penalties
could have applied in this case.154 Like the earlier tax shelters of the 1980s
that relied on an ostensible sale to obtain depreciation deductions,155 the
depreciation deductions obtained by Wells Fargo in the transaction
depended upon the basis it obtained through its purported purchase of the
transportation assets. Because the transaction was ultimately disregarded
under the economic substance doctrine, the IRS could have asserted that
the correct basis in the assets was zero, resulting in a gross valuation
misstatement.
Additionally, because the court determined that Wells Fargo lacked a
non-tax purpose for entering into the transaction, the transaction likely
would satisfy the definition of a tax shelter for purposes of the substantial
understatement rules. Further, the reportable transaction understatement
penalty could have been asserted156 because SILO transactions are listed
transactions.157
b.

Palm Canyon: The Son-of-BOSS Tax Shelter

In Palm Canyon X Investments v. Commissioner,158 the Tax Court
found that the taxpayer‟s “Son-of-BOSS”159 tax shelter lacked economic
151. Id. at 81.
152. Id. at 82.
153. Id. at 83.
154. This is assuming that the taxpayer could not meet the reasonable cause or other
relevant defenses for the penalties.
155. See, e.g., Massengill, 876 F.2d 616 (denying depreciation deductions and
investment tax credit on cattle purchase and upholding valuation misstatement penalty).
156. This is assuming the tax year at issue was after the transaction was listed, and after
the enactment of the reportable transaction rules in 2004.
157. I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, supra note 145. A compilation of all listed transactions is
available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html.
158. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009).
159. These tax shelters grew out of and resemble an earlier tax shelter termed “BOSS”
(Bond and Option Sales Strategy), leading to the name “Son-of-BOSS.” See I.R.S. Notice
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substance. The Son-of-BOSS shelter has multiple variations, all of which
revolve around creating an artificially high basis in a partnership interest
and subsequently disposing of that interest at a loss.160 Under one common
variation, the taxpayer borrows at a premium and contributes the proceeds
to a partnership, with the partnership assuming the debt.161 The taxpayer
takes the position that when the debt is assumed, its basis in its partnership
interest is reduced only by the principal amount of the debt under I.R.C. §
752,162 but not by the additional amount of the loan proceeds that represent
the premium.163 When the taxpayer disposes of its partnership interest, it
takes a loss in the amount of its basis, although its actual cash outlay in the
transaction was zero or close to zero.164
In Palm Canyon, the taxpayer entered into another common Son-ofBOSS variation in which the taxpayer enters into offsetting foreign
currency options that are contributed to a partnership.165 The taxpayer took
the position that its basis was only offset by the long option, but that the
short option was too speculative to constitute a “liability” for purposes of
I.R.C. § 752.166 As in all Son-of-BOSS transactions, the ultimate result for
the taxpayer was a tax loss with only nominal economic outlay.167 The Tax
Court held that the transaction lacked economic substance, concluding that
the taxpayer did not have a legitimate non-tax business purpose for entering
into the transaction, and that the transaction lacked pretax profit
potential.168
The Tax Court held that the gross valuation misstatement penalty
applied, or, in the alternative, that the transaction resulted in a substantial
understatement subject to the tax shelter rules, or was subject to the
negligence penalty.169 As is the case for any Son-of-BOSS transaction, the
tax benefits in the case were derived from the taxpayer‟s basis in its

2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/notice_200044.pdf.; I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761.
160. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. Under I.R.C. § 752 (West 1954) (as amended in 1986), an assumption of a partner‟s
liability by a partnership is treated as a cash distribution to that partner, which reduces its
basis in its partnership interest.
163. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 159.
164. Id.
165. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, at *4, *14.
166. Id. at *14. See also Lee A. Sheppard, Recent Shelter Cases: The Right Result For
The Wrong Reasons, 126 TAX NOTES 421, 426 (2010) (describing the Son-of-BOSS
transaction at issue in the Palm Canyon case).
167. Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, at *14.
168. Id. at *27. The Tax Court did not have to determine whether a conjunctive or
disjunctive test for economic substance was appropriate because it found that neither prong
was satisfied. Id. at *19.
169. Id. at *29-*36.
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partnership interest, which, when reduced to zero, resulted in a gross
valuation misstatement. Additionally, the tax shelter rules for substantial
understatements applied “[b]ecause the sole purpose of the . . . transaction
was tax avoidance.”170 Finally, the transaction would have constituted a
reportable transaction on at least two grounds. Not only is the Son-ofBOSS tax shelter a listed transaction,171 but the transaction resulted in a
claimed loss of approximately $5 million dollars, which would have likely
satisfied the requirements for a loss transaction.172
c.

Country Pine: The CARDS Tax Shelter

Country Pine Finance v. Commissioner173 involved the Custom
Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (“CARDS”) tax shelter. In a typical
CARDS transaction, a tax neutral party (such as a foreign entity not subject
to U.S. taxation) incurs long-term debt from a lender and uses the proceeds
to purchase assets such as short-term deposits or government bonds.174 The
taxpayer enters into a separate agreement with the tax neutral entity under
which the taxpayer receives a portion of the purchased assets in exchange
for the taxpayer‟s agreement to become co-obligor on the loan.175 The fair
market value of the assets transferred to the taxpayer is substantially less
than the principal amount of the debt for which the taxpayer has agreed to
become jointly and severally liable.176 The taxpayer claims that its
assumption of liability on the debt gives it a basis equal to the entire
principal amount of the debt, and subsequently disposes of the assets at a
loss.177
The Tax Court held that Country Pine‟s transaction lacked economic
substance and disallowed the claimed loss.178 The court found that the
170. Id. at *35.
171. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 159.
172. The $5 million dollar loss was claimed by Thighmaster World Corp., an S
corporation, which is subject to the $2 million threshold for loss transactions under Treas.
Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(D). Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, at *11. To be subject to
I.R.C. § 6662A as a non-listed reportable transaction, the transaction must have tax
avoidance as a significant purpose, a requirement which would have been satisfied based on
the court‟s finding in this case.
173. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (2009).
174. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730 (describing the mechanics of the
“CARDS” tax shelter).
175. Id. The fair market value of the asset transferred to the taxpayer equals the present
value of the loan‟s principal payment at maturity, which the taxpayer agrees to pay.
176. Id. The tax neutral entity agrees to make all interest payments on the loan, and the
parties anticipate that the purchased assets will constitute sufficient collateral to repay the
loan.
177. Id.
178. See Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 at *16 (noting the loss was artificial
and that the taxpayer lacked a nontax business purpose for entering into the transaction).
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transaction failed the objective prong because it lacked profit potential and
resulted in negative cash flow.179 Additionally, the transaction failed the
subjective prong because the court found that there was substantial
evidence that the decision to enter into the transaction was motivated solely
by tax avoidance.180
The IRS did not assert penalties in the Country Pine case.181
However, the CARDS tax shelter relies on an inflated basis to achieve a
deductible loss, which makes the gross valuation misstatement penalty
applicable to the transaction. Additionally, the Tax Court‟s finding that the
transaction was motivated solely by tax avoidance should satisfy the
definition of tax shelter for purposes of the substantial understatement
penalty. Finally, as was the case with the Son-of-BOSS tax shelter, the
CARDS tax shelter at issue in Country Pine is both a listed transaction182
and is likely a loss transaction,183 which would have made the reportable
transaction understatement penalty applicable in this case.
This analysis indicates that, even though tax shelters have evolved
over time, the tax shelter penalties in the current accuracy-related regime
should continue to apply in economic substance doctrine cases. The
creation of a new tax shelter penalty does not appear to fill any gaps in the
current regime.
4.

The Complexity that Results from Adding a Fourth Tax Shelter
Penalty

Given that the current accuracy-related penalty regime is more than
adequate to address tax shelters, the new economic substance penalty does
not appear to add anything useful to this regime. Rather, the new penalty
exacerbates the problems with the current regime, which is arguably overcomplicated already.
While noble, Congress‟s repeated attempts to stiffen penalties on tax
shelters have been piecemeal.184 Newer penalties have been enacted
179. Id. at *15.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *8.
182. I.R.S.
Notice
2002-21,
2002-1
C.B.
730,
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html .
183. The case involved a partnership, Country Pine Finance LLC, that had individual
members. The partnership claimed a $7,917,000 short-term capital loss and a $4,045,000
ordinary loss, which it disclosed under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T (2007). Country
Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410, at *8. The reportable transaction rules have a $2 million
threshold for losses claimed by partnerships that do not have all corporate partners.
Additionally, there is an even lower threshold ($50,000) for individual losses based on
certain foreign currency transactions. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(C), (E) (as amended in
2010).
184. See, e.g., NY Bar Submits Comments, supra note 98 (proposing modifications to
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without removing or amending old penalties, with no explanation as to
whether the newer penalties are intended to replace the older penalties, or
whether they are meant to supplement the older regime by filling
specifically identified gaps.185 The result is that when dealing with an
abusive tax shelter, a complicated matrix of potential penalties exists, each
with different taxpayer defenses.
When a taxpayer is contemplating whether to enter into a particular
transaction, or contemplating whether to take a certain tax position with
respect to a completed transaction, the taxpayer may seek advice from an
advisor or attempt to determine the potential tax consequences on its own.
Either way, if the tax position is questionable, an important consideration
likely will be the consequences of the taxpayer‟s position not being
sustained on the merits, including what types of penalties might apply. A
further consideration, particularly for a more sophisticated taxpayer, might
be what can be done to avoid the application of a penalty in the event the
taxpayer‟s position is not sustained on the merits.
For a taxpayer or tax advisor attempting to undertake such an analysis,
a number of accuracy-related penalties must be considered.186 The
requirements for avoiding accuracy-related penalties will depend on how
the transaction is characterized. For example, if the taxpayer‟s position
results in a substantial understatement or a gross valuation misstatement,
the taxpayer may be able to avail itself of the reasonable cause and good
faith defense provided by I.R.C. § 6664(c). Even if there is not substantial
legal authority that supports the taxpayer‟s position, the taxpayer may still
be able to avoid the penalty through, for example, reasonable and good
faith reliance on the advice of a tax advisor.187
However, if the transaction is deemed a “tax shelter,” the taxpayer
may be subject to the more stringent reasonable cause and good faith
requirements for tax shelters, which require, at a minimum, both substantial
authority and a reasonable belief that the taxpayer‟s position was more
likely than not correct.188 In this case, the taxpayer‟s good faith reliance on
the Section 6662 penalty in America‟s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009).
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1 (stating that this consideration is in addition to any nonaccuracy-related penalties that may apply).
187. The most important factor in determining whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable
cause and good faith for purposes of I.R.C. §6664(c) is the extent of the taxpayer‟s efforts to
assess her proper tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2003). Circumstances that may
indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law
that is reasonable in light of the taxpayer‟s experience, knowledge, and education, or
reliance on the advice of a professional if such reliance was reasonable under the
circumstances and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Id.
188. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f) (2003) (the heightened reasonable cause and good faith
requirement only applies to corporate taxpayers).
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the advice of a tax advisor will not be sufficient to avoid the penalty if there
is not legal authority amounting to “substantial authority” that supports the
taxpayer‟s position.189 Additionally, even if there is substantial authority to
support the taxpayer‟s position, the taxpayer‟s reliance on an advisor will
not be sufficient unless the advisor has unambiguously concluded there is a
greater than 50 percent likelihood that the taxpayer‟s position would be
upheld if challenged.190
A taxpayer must further consider whether its transaction would
constitute a reportable transaction. If so, it will not be able to avail itself of
the heightened reasonable cause and good faith defense unless it discloses
its transaction.191 Finally, if the transaction could be found to violate the
economic substance doctrine, then no reasonable cause or other defenses
will be available if the new economic substance penalty applies.192
A taxpayer contemplating a transaction that could potentially fall into
several of these categories must contemplate whether it should attempt to
satisfy the most stringent reasonable cause requirements, or whether it
should assume that it will be subject to strict liability if penalized. In that
case, the taxpayer might determine it is not worth the expense to satisfy the
reasonable cause requirements. In addition to trying to determine which, if
any, defenses the taxpayer should attempt to satisfy, the rate of the penalty
will vary depending on which penalty applies.
The various defenses to accuracy-related penalties, as applicable after
the recent codification of the economic substance doctrine, are illustrated in
Appendix A. As can be seen from the table in Appendix A, the accuracyrelated penalty regime presents a complicated matrix of taxpayer defenses
for tax shelter transactions.
B.

The Negative Implications of Complexity

The overlap between the new economic substance penalty and the
current tax shelter penalties creates unnecessary complexity in the current
penalty regime. Over-complicating the accuracy-related penalty regime
defeats the very purpose for which these penalties were enacted.
Taxpayers cannot be encouraged to comply with the tax laws if they do not
understand the penalties that were designed to encourage good behavior.
Similarly, the IRS must fully comprehend the intricacies of the penalty
regime and have the resources to effectively enforce it.

189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra text accompanying note 32.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(B)(2) (2003).
See supra note 50.
See supra text accompanying note 81.
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The Stated Purpose Behind the Penalty Regime

The IRS‟s official policy on tax penalties is that they exist primarily to
“encourage voluntary compliance.”193
Other than its brief policy
statements in the Internal Revenue Manual, which are updated from time to
time, the IRS‟s last official elucidation on penalty policy was offered in
1989, when an IRS task force published the results of a comprehensive
study on civil tax penalties.194 The report concluded that tax penalties
promote voluntary compliance by helping taxpayers understand “right”
versus “wrong” conduct, by deterring noncompliance, and by establishing
the fairness of the tax system.195
The task force highlighted the importance of “comprehensibility” in
tax penalties, observing that the IRS‟s goal of voluntary compliance
required that penalties be both “understandable and understood” by
taxpayers.196 In order to properly deter taxpayers, the task force concluded
that they must understand the probable consequences of their departure
from the requirements of the tax laws, and further understand the logic
upon which the penalty being imposed is based.197
In addition to promoting the deterrence objectives of voluntary
compliance, the task force noted the effect that comprehensibility has on
the administration of penalties. Specifically, the task force observed that:
As penalties become more numerous and more complicated, it
becomes more difficult for an employee of the IRS to be aware of
all penalties and to make quality judgments as to when they
should be asserted or abated. Thus, complexity works against
both a taxpayer‟s ability to understand the consequences of
noncompliance and the Service‟s ability to administer the system
effectively and fairly.198
The penalty policies announced by the IRS task force, including the
importance of comprehensibility, were also articulated by Congress when it
overhauled the former penalty regime in 1989 in favor of a system that was
193. IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, I.R.M. § 20.1.1.2 (Feb. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-001r.html#d0e406; IRS Policy Statement 20-1,
I.R.M. § 1.2.20.1.1 (June 29, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/irm_01-002020.html.
194. Tax Analysts, IRS Executive Task Force Releases Penalty Reform Proposals, 89
TNT 45-36 (Feb. 27, 1989) (LEXIS) [hereinafter Tax Analysts II] (citing Executive Task
Force for the Commissioner‟s Penalty Study, Report on Civil Tax Penalties) (the stated goal
of the Task Force‟s report was to set out the underlying reasons for tax penalties, a method
of evaluating them, goals for penalty administration, an evaluation of existing penalties, and
recommendations for change).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 43.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 44.
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more closely tailored to the goal of promoting voluntary compliance.199
Commentators and practitioners have also echoed the importance of
comprehensibility in promoting voluntary compliance in more recent years.
For example, in a statement of policy released by the American Bar
Association Section of Taxation in 2009, the authors concluded that
promoting voluntary compliance “requires that the penalties be relatively
simple and logical.”200
The current tax shelter penalty regime has trended away from the
IRS‟s and Congress‟s stated policy of enacting penalties that are simple and
easy to understand and to administer. The economic substance penalty
further frustrates this stated policy because it adds yet another penalty to
the list of accuracy-related penalties aimed at tax shelters, and contains
standards (for example, strict liability) that are distinct from the standards
imposed by the other tax shelter penalties. The substantial overlap that
exists between the application of other tax shelter penalties and the new
economic substance penalty201 will make it hard for taxpayers to determine
which penalty or penalties they must consider when contemplating the
consequences of their conduct. This will inevitably require a certain
amount of guesswork, particularly since neither the reportable transaction
understatement penalty nor the new economic substance penalty has been
tested in economic substance doctrine cases.
Additionally, the differing standards among the penalties require the
taxpayer to consider a variety of requirements for a potential reasonable
cause defense, which further frustrates the goal of promoting voluntary
compliance.202 For example, a taxpayer undertaking a transaction that
might constitute a tax shelter and violate the economic substance doctrine
will not know whether it is best served by incurring the additional time and
expense to satisfy the heightened reasonable cause and good faith

199. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98 (citing the Improved Penalty
Administration and Compliance Tax Act, enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106). For example, Sen. J.J.
Pickle, Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight, observed that penalties should be
“readily known and easily understood.” Id. at 3 (citing Letter from Sen. J.J. Pickle,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight, to Sen. Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House
Ways and Means Committee (June 15, 1989) (available at 1989 TNT 128-4) (1989)
(LEXIS)).
200. Tax Analysts, ABA Tax Section Recommends Overhaul of Tax Penalty Regime,
2009 TNT 75-25 (Apr. 22, 2009) (LEXIS) [hereinafter Tax Analysts III] (citing Stuart M.
Lewis, Statement of Policy Favoring Reform of Federal Civil Tax Penalties, 2009 TNT 7525, 2, (2009)). See also REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98 (“Penalties should
articulate standards of behavior that are clear and understandable so that taxpayers and
practitioners know the extent of their obligations . . . .”).
201. See supra Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.2.
202. See supra Part IV.A.4.
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requirement,203 or whether it will likely be subject to strict liability if its
position is not upheld. In effect, the new economic substance penalty has
injected additional uncertainty as to what type of behavior Congress
intends to encourage. Does Congress want to encourage taxpayers to seek
the advice of tax professionals, thus promoting tax positions that are
arrived at after a reasoned, legal analysis of relevant tax authority? Or is
Congress‟s primary aim to more effectively deter taxpayers from
participating in tax shelters by depriving them of any “out,” including
reliance on a tax opinion?204 The answer is unclear. Either way, Congress
cannot effectively shape taxpayer behavior through penalties if taxpayers
do not know the standards that will apply to their conduct.
2.

Thoughtful Penalty Legislation

The guiding principles highlighted in the task force report are no less
true today than they were twenty years ago when the IRS announced its
penalty philosophy. The importance of comprehensibility is particularly
relevant in today‟s tax penalty regime, as penalties have become more
numerous and complex over time.205
Since the issuance of the IRS task force report in 1989, there has been
a growing emphasis on the use of penalties to combat abusive tax shelters.
Differentiating penalties imposed on taxpayers who participate in tax
shelters from other penalties aimed at less egregious conduct necessitates
some degree of additional complexity in the penalty regime. However, to
continue to promote voluntary compliance, the benefits obtained through
increasing the complexity of the penalty regime should be carefully
weighed against the detriment it may cause to the overall policy goals of
the penalty regime.
To this end, additional penalties should only be enacted after thorough
evaluation of how the current penalty regime has addressed the perceived
problem that the new penalty proposes to solve. Congress should avoid
“piling on penalties”206 by seeking first to identify and correct gaps in the
203. This expense may arise, for example, through the engagement of a professional tax
advisor to render a tax opinion that satisfies the “more likely than not” standard required for
reasonable cause.
204. It does not appear that Congress has answered this question. If the new economic
substance doctrine penalty represents a new congressional attitude towards penalties, then
presumably the strict liability standard is a replacement of the older reasonable cause
standard.
205. See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING THE PENALTY REGIME 1 (2008) (explaining that between 1954
and 2008, the number of civil tax penalties increased from approximately 14 to more than
130).
206. An earlier proposal for the new strict liability economic substance penalty was
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current penalty regime before adding new penalties to the regime.
Additionally, the enactment of new penalties, or amendments to current
penalties, should not be undertaken in a vacuum. Even if a new penalty is
deemed necessary because the current regime is entirely inadequate to
address a particular problem, Congress should consider whether older
penalties should be repealed, or whether it needs to clarify the interaction
between the new penalty and the current penalties.207
In contrast to this approach, it appears the new economic substance
penalty was enacted without careful consideration of the effectiveness of
the current accuracy-related penalty regime in the context of tax shelters.
For example, it is almost inconceivable that Congress could have
determined that the new reportable transaction understatement penalty,
enacted just six years ago in 2004, was insufficient in economic substance
doctrine cases, when the case law has not yet caught up with the effective
date of this penalty.208 Additionally, Congress would have better served the
goal of comprehensibility in the tax penalty regime by clarifying
application of the current penalties to economic substance doctrine cases,
such as clarifying the circuit split on the application of the gross valuation
misstatement penalty,209 rather than enacting a new penalty. If Congress
did have specific justifications for a new penalty that outweigh the
additional complexity created by the penalty, it has not effectively
articulated these so that taxpayers, advisors, and the IRS can understand
how and when the new penalty should be applied vis-à-vis the other tax
shelter penalties.
This part has demonstrated that creating a new economic substance
penalty is unnecessary because the current accuracy-related penalty regime
is sufficient to address transactions that violate the economic substance
doctrine. This part has further demonstrated that the new economic
substance penalty will frustrate the goal of promoting voluntary compliance
through comprehensibility because the new penalty adds significant and
undue complexity to the current regime.
Given the substantial overlap between transactions that violate the
economic substance doctrine and transactions covered by the other tax
appropriately described by then-IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb as “the latest example of
Congress piling on penalties . . . .” Tax Analysts I, supra note 108. The American Bar
Association Tax Section‟s statement on penalty policy also pointed out that stacking new
penalties on top of existing penalties results in increased complexity and “do[es] little to
enhance the perception of the tax system as reasonable.” Tax Analysts III, supra note 200,
at 4.
207. Although accuracy-related penalties generally cannot be stacked, the IRS is always
free to assert a number of penalties in the alternative in the case of single transaction. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
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shelter penalties, the economic substance penalty does not appear to add
anything “new” to the current regime, other than strict liability. But in
addition to failing to articulate the reasons for enacting a new tax shelter
penalty in light of the current penalty regime, Congress has also failed to
articulate the reasons for imposing strict liability on transactions that
violate the economic substance doctrine when it has elected not to do so for
past tax shelter penalties.
V.

IS THERE A PLACE FOR STRICT LIABILITY IN THE CURRENT PENALTY
REGIME?

This part considers whether there is any justification for carving out
transactions that violate economic substance as especially deserving of
strict liability as compared to reportable transactions or tax shelter
transactions where the economic substance doctrine has not been raised.
This part will not attempt to make any normative conclusions about
whether strict liability is fair or an effective deterrent in the context of tax
penalties. Rather, I will argue that the strict liability aspect of the penalty
cannot be justified in the context of the current penalty regime, which does
not provide for strict liability, because there is nothing special about the
economic substance doctrine as compared to other methods of policing tax
shelters. While I have argued in Part IV that a new penalty is unnecessary
altogether, irrespective of the standard imposed by that penalty, Part V will
focus specifically on the strict liability standard and conclude that it cannot
be reconciled with the standards imposed by the other tax shelter penalties.
A.

There’s Nothing Special About the Economic Substance Doctrine

It is clear that the recent legislation codifying the economic substance
doctrine and adding a new economic substance penalty was intended by
Congress to address the tax shelter epidemic.210 This was also true when
Congress enacted the valuation misstatement penalty, the substantial
understatement penalty (with the carve out for tax shelters), and the
reportable transaction understatement penalty.211
The justifications
advanced for the new economic substance penalty have largely centered
210. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S2624-01 (2009) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“[The
economic substance doctrine] has become a powerful analytical tool used by courts to
invalidate abusive tax shelters . . . . Since no tax shelter legislation would be complete
without addressing this issue . . . this comprehensive bill proposes once more to include the
economic substance doctrine in the tax code.”); 151 CONG. REC. S9472-01 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Bond) (“[This] bill would strengthen legal prohibitions against abusive
tax shelters by codifying in federal tax statutes for the first time what is known as the
economic substance doctrine.”).
211. See supra Part II.A.
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around the goal of deterring participation in tax shelters and giving the IRS
an extra advantage in factually complex tax shelter transactions.212 These
justifications are appropriate concerns in the context of abusive tax shelters,
but they don‟t address what it is about violations of the economic substance
doctrine, apart from tax shelters in general, that merits a strict liability
penalty. To justify singling out transactions that violate the economic
substance doctrine for special treatment, Congress should have articulated
why such transactions stand apart from other tax shelters.
1.

“Tax Shelters” Versus the Economic Substance Doctrine

It is difficult to determine if violations of the economic substance
doctrine are a subset of tax shelters, if tax shelters are a subset of violations
of the economic substance, or if the two can be considered proxies for one
another. There is no legislative or regulatory definition of a “tax shelter”
that is intended as a substantive disallowance provision. In other words,
tax shelters have been attacked from many angles, but there is no Internal
Revenue Code provision that prohibits the use of “tax shelters” per se.
This is unsurprising given the difficulty, if not impossibility, of finding a
universal definition for the term.213
Although there may not be a generally accepted definition of what
constitutes a tax shelter,214 commentators have agreed on some of the
defining characteristics of abusive tax shelters. Tax shelters have been
described broadly as tax strategies that produce unintended benefits while
complying with the literal terms of the Internal Revenue Code.215 Put more
simply, what separates abusive tax shelters from other transactions is
whether or not Congress intended to provide the result claimed by the
taxpayer.216 Tax shelters have also been described as transactions that
produce a tax deduction or tax loss without an accompanying economic

212. See supra Part III.B.1.
213. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 71, at 399.
214. See id.; Calvin H. Johnson, What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 879 (1995)
(arguing that the best definition of “tax shelter” involves investments that are more valuable
post-tax than pre-tax); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The
Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 328
(2002) (noting the absence of a universal definition and proposing that “tax shelter” be
defined in terms of violation of congressional intent).
215. Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Disclosure: Towards Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2009).
216. Lederman, supra note 71, at 396-97. See also Schler, supra note 214, at 330 (“[I]t
seems impossible to define a tax shelter except in terms of congressional or regulatory
intent.”). Schler argues that a tax shelter should be defined as a transaction that complies
with the literal terms of the Internal Revenue Code, reaches a result unintended by
Congress, and is accompanied by a tax avoidance motive. Id. at 331.
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loss.217 In contrast, there are other types of abusive transactions that
generally would not be considered to constitute tax shelters, such as
fraudulent transactions or transactions that constitute tax evasion.218
While the term “tax shelter” has been defined in the context of the
penalty regime for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty,219
that definition generally has been limited to its specific context. A
definition that is based upon the taxpayer having a tax avoidance motive,
such as that found in I.R.C. § 6662(d), is overly broad since it encompasses
transactions that do not necessarily fall within the commonly accepted
notion of tax shelters.220 For example, nearly everyone would agree that
the making of a check-the-box election under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)
would not constitute a tax shelter, even if the taxpayer‟s sole motivation for
making the election was to avoid tax.221
Defining tax shelters by reference to the two prongs of the economic
substance doctrine, as transactions that lack economic substance or a
business purpose, is also overly broad. For example, one commentator has
suggested that a transaction in which a taxpayer intentionally sells an asset
to trigger gain that is offset by an expiring net operating loss, followed by
an immediate repurchase of the asset with a stepped-up basis, would lack
objective economic substance and a business purpose, but would not be
considered to be a tax shelter.222 It has also been suggested that such a
definition of tax shelter is too narrow, as this would exclude transactions
that meet the bare minimum amount of objective substance or business
purpose to satisfy the economic substance doctrine but would otherwise be
considered to be tax shelters.223
Although tax shelters continue to be generally undefined in
legislation, Congress has specifically defined what constitutes a violation
of the economic substance doctrine.224 Under new I.R.C. § 7701(o), a
transaction will only be treated as having economic substance if it changes
217. David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be
Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29, 31 (2006). See also Peter Canellos, Tax Practitioner’s
Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions
and Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 52-53 (2001) (comparing “real transactions” with
“tax shelters”).
218. Lederman, supra note 71, at 396 n.19. While a tax shelter generally complies with
the literal terms of the tax code, a fraudulent or illegal transaction does not. Schler, supra
note 214, at 330.
219. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Schler, supra note 214, at 329 (noting that issuance of debt rather than
equity would not constitute a tax shelter even if the sole motive was to obtain the interest
deduction).
221. Id.
222. Hariton, supra note 217, at 35-36.
223. Schler, supra note 214, at 329-30.
224. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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the taxpayer‟s economic position in a meaningful, non-tax way, and if the
taxpayer has a substantial non-tax purpose for entering into the
transaction.225
The new economic substance doctrine legislation is, however, only a
clarification of the existing judicial doctrine.226 It is intended to provide “a
uniform definition of economic substance,” but is not intended to alter the
flexibility of courts in determining when the doctrine is relevant to a
particular transaction.227 More importantly, the new legislation (and the
legislative history thereof) does not claim to provide a uniform definition of
“tax shelter.” As discussed above, the objective and subjective prongs of
the economic substance doctrine are both too broad and too narrow to fully
encompass all abusive tax shelters.
But defining tax shelters was not the intent of codification of the
economic substance doctrine. The economic substance doctrine is merely a
judicial tool used to disallow tax benefits not intended by Internal Revenue
Code when the substantive provisions of the Code fail to provide a basis for
disallowance.228 The doctrine gives courts one mechanism to distinguish
between legitimate transactions and abusive tax shelters. However, courts
may confront other tax shelters where the economic substance doctrine is
not necessary to disallow the claimed benefits. This can be seen, for
example, in tax shelter cases where courts have held against the taxpayer
on alternative grounds that included both the economic substance doctrine
and a substantive provision of the Code.229
The relationship between the economic substance doctrine and tax
shelters makes it difficult to understand why Congress singled out the new
economic substance penalty for a strict liability penalty. To isolate
violations of economic substance as deserving of strict liability seems to
suggest that, out of the realm of all tax shelters, these are the “worst” kinds
of transactions. Yet Congress does not appear to be isolating a subset of
tax shelters by codifying the doctrine. Tax shelters are clearly the problem,
and the economic substance doctrine is simply one mechanism for
substantively attacking the problem.

225. See supra note 74.
226. I.R.C. § 7701(o) is appropriately entitled “Clarification of Economic Substance
Doctrine.”
227. See JCX-18-10, supra note 70, at 152; JCX-11-10, supra note 70, at 189; JCX-4709, supra note 70, at 90; see also H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“. . .
the provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other
rule of law . . . .”), and supra note 71 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1354 (“[T]he economic substance doctrine is merely a
judicial tool for effectuating the underlying Congressional purpose that, despite literal
compliance with the statute, tax benefits not be afforded based on transactions lacking in
economic substance.”).
229. See supra note 96.
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Another possibility is that applying strict liability to violations of the
economic substance doctrine is Congress‟s way of saying that all tax
shelters are now subject to strict liability. But if that is the case, Congress
should have explicitly said so. Codification of the economic substance
doctrine is a poor (although perhaps convenient) platform for legislating a
sweeping change to how Congress will now penalize tax shelters. Further,
the fact that the reasonable cause defense was not removed from the other
tax shelter penalties does not align with this theory.
2.

Making Sense of the Current Tax Shelter Penalty Standards

Despite the difficulty of drafting substantive rules to prohibit tax
shelters, the tax shelter problem has been addressed with some degree of
success through disclosure rules and penalty provisions specifically
targeted at tax shelters.230 Although these tax shelter penalties have
evolved over time, the changes to the accuracy-related penalty regime in
the past decade can be understood when viewed in the context of
Congress‟s overall goal of cracking down on tax shelters.
For example, the 2004 Jobs Act eliminated the substantial authority
and reasonable belief excuse for all taxpayers participating in tax
shelters.231
This makes sense because defenses for substantial
understatements with respect to tax shelters should be more limited than the
defenses for other substantial understatements since tax shelters are the
transactions Congress has a special interest in deterring and punishing.232
It‟s true that the definition of “tax shelter” in I.R.C. § 6662(d) casts a wider
net than what most would consider to be characteristic of true tax
shelters.233 However, the very use of the term “tax shelter” in the penalty
legislation at least gives some indication of what sets the penalty apart from
other substantial understatements. While the scope of the carve out for tax
shelters in I.R.C. § 6662(d) is imperfect, it at least sends a clear message
that Congress intended for taxpayer defenses to be limited when they
230. See supra Part IV.A.1; Canellos, supra note 217, at 52 (considering the tax bar‟s
conclusion that disclosure rules and penalty provisions largely solve the problem of tax
shelters).
231. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
232. The difference in standards between the gross valuation misstatement penalty and
the substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters can be similarly justified. Although
the valuation misstatement penalty was enacted in response to the tax shelter epidemic, it
was drafted broadly to address all valuation misstatements meeting a certain threshold, and
Congress did not attempt to limit it to “tax shelters.” See supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text. However, the more than twenty year gap in time between the enactment
of the original valuation misstatement and the 2004 Jobs Act probably has more to do with
the difference in standards between these penalties.
233. See supra notes 220 and 221 and accompanying text.
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participate in tax shelters.
The addition of the reportable transaction understatement penalty is
also comprehensible in the overall context of the accuracy-related penalty
regime. At the time the penalty was enacted in 2004, a tax shelter penalty
for substantial understatements was already in place with a heightened
reasonable cause defense. The newer reportable transaction understatement
penalty is even more severe than the substantial understatement penalty for
tax shelters because it provides a more restrictive reasonable cause defense
(requiring disclosure), along with a higher rate for undisclosed transactions,
and the use of the understatement (rather than the underpayment) as the
penalty base.234 Although congressional justifications for the new penalty
were generic and vague,235 some sense can be made of the fact that the
reportable and listed transactions were being singled out and treated
differently.
First, the reportable transaction understatement penalty addresses a
specific subset of tax shelters. The penalty applies to all listed transactions
and any reportable transaction for which the taxpayer has a significant
purpose of tax avoidance.236 Reportable transactions are specific types of
transactions that have been identified by Treasury regulations as having the
potential for tax avoidance or evasion, and include listed transactions,
confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection, loss
transactions, and transactions of interest.237 For both listed transactions and
transactions of interest, the transaction has been specifically identified by
the IRS through a notice or other publication.238 The characteristics of
confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection, and loss
transactions are also specifically identified by the regulations.239 While it
may be difficult to determine whether a transaction falls under the vague
definition of “tax shelter” for purposes of the substantial understatement
penalty, it is comparatively easy, for example, to determine whether a
transaction constitutes a listed transaction.
Congress was not attempting to define all tax shelters through I.R.C. §
6662A, but it singled out a group of common tax shelter transactions for
special treatment. Because listed and reportable transactions are a
specifically identified subset of tax shelters, a separate penalty standard for
these transactions is justifiable.
234. See I.R.C. §§ 6662A(a)-(d) (West 2010); H.R. 108-393, 108th Cong. Title III.A.5
(2003). There is no reasonable cause exception if the transaction is undisclosed.
235. H.R. 108-393, 108th Cong. Title III.A.5 (2003).
236. I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2) (West 2010).
237. See I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d) (West 2010), 6707A(c)(1) (West 2010); Treas. Reg. §
1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2010); and text accompanying note 44.
238. See I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d) (West 2010), 6707A(c)(1) (West 2010); Treas. Reg. §
1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2010); and text accompanying note 44.
239. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)-(5) (as amended in 2010).
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Second, the fact that the standard for reportable and listed transactions
is stricter than the standard imposed by other tax shelter penalties is also
justifiable (although this was also not articulated by Congress). Because
these transactions have been specifically identified and described in
Treasury regulations, taxpayers are on notice as to whether or not a
particular transaction is considered to be a tax shelter and will be penalized
as such.240 Given that Congress has specified which types of transactions
need to be reported by taxpayers, it is not illogical to require disclosure to
maintain a reasonable cause defense, even though other tax shelter
penalties can be avoided without such disclosure.
3.

No Justification for the New Strict Liability Penalty

In contrast to reportable and listed transactions, the economic
substance doctrine legislation does not identify a narrowly defined subset
of tax shelter transactions. It also does not identify a new type of behavior
not anticipated by other tax shelter penalties. The doctrine merely provides
a legal basis to disallow tax shelter benefits where other substantive
provisions of the tax law fall short. Thus, there is no reason to carve out
violations of the economic substance doctrine as a unique group of tax
shelter transactions deserving of a stricter penalty as compared to other tax
shelter penalties.
We don‟t have an explanation as to why, after the enactment of the
new penalty, taxpayers in violation of economic substance doctrine are
subject to strict liability, while taxpayers whose transactions constitute a
“tax shelter” for purposes of the substantial understatement rules can rely
on a reasonable cause defense. What we do know is that the legislative
history of both the substantial understatement and economic substance
doctrine penalties indicates that Congress wanted to crack down on tax
shelters.241 Given that violations of the economic substance doctrine do not
represent a unique subset of tax shelters, and given that there does not
appear to be anything more onerous about violating the economic
substance doctrine as compared to participating in a tax shelter as defined
under I.R.C. § 6662(d), there is no reason for taxpayer defenses to the
economic substance penalty to be more limited than the defenses for the
substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters.
If Congress felt that the “tax shelter” definition under I.R.C. § 6662(d)
was too broad to be treated on par with violations of the economic
substance doctrine, perhaps out of concern that the “tax shelter” definition

240. The reportable transaction understatement penalty is only effective for tax years
ending after the date of its enactment. See supra text accompanying note 62.
241. See supra text accompanying note 35; supra Part II.B.2.a.
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may cover some non-tax shelter types of transactions,242 then it is unclear
why the substantial understatement penalty with respect to tax shelters has
a heightened reasonable cause defense at all. If Congress had some other
justification for treating violations of the economic substance doctrine more
harshly than tax shelters under I.R.C. § 6662(d), it should have articulated
this reasoning. Without any rationalization for the differences in these
taxpayer defenses, the accuracy-related penalty regime contains
inconsistent standards, leading to disparate treatment of similarly situated
taxpayers.
In the case of reportable and listed transactions, the disparity in
standards is even harder to justify. Although Congress did adopt a
provision that provides for strict liability for reportable and listed
transactions that also violate the economic substance doctrine, it chose not
to make strict liability the standard for all reportable and listed transactions
subject to the reportable transaction understatement.243 The result is simply
that when a transaction is subject to both penalties, the standards in the
economic substance penalty trump the reasonable cause defense for
reportable transactions. In a tax shelter case where a court disallows tax
benefits under a substantive provision of the Code and opts not to apply the
economic substance doctrine, it appears the reasonable cause defense
would still be available to the taxpayer if the reportable transaction
understatement penalty is applied.
The fact that taxpayers are on notice as to what constitutes a
reportable or listed transaction justifies the more limited taxpayer defenses
for the reportable transaction understatement. In contrast, violations of the
economic substance doctrine arise in areas of the law that are unclear, when
neither statute nor case law is directly on point. Strict liability is not
appropriate in the context of the economic substance doctrine given that
Congress has explicitly rejected strict liability for listed and reportable
transactions.244
This discrepancy between the taxpayer defenses to reportable
transaction understatements and the economic substance penalty could lead
to absurd results. For example, a taxpayer could engage in a listed
transaction, but if the benefits are disallowed by the IRS or a court under a
substantive provision of the Code rather than the economic substance
doctrine, the taxpayer might be able to avoid all penalties if she can meet
the heightened reasonable cause and good faith requirements for the
reportable transaction understatement.245 On the other hand, a taxpayer that
242. Schler, supra note 214, at 329.
243. H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 1409(c)(2) (2010); I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010).
244. H.R. 108-393, 108th Cong. Title III.A.5 (2003).
245. It might be difficult, however, for a taxpayer to demonstrate that she had a
reasonable belief that her position was more likely than not correct when the transaction had
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engages in a tax shelter that has not yet been identified by the IRS as a
listed transaction would not be able to rely on a reasonable cause defense if
her tax benefits were disallowed under the economic substance doctrine. In
some respects, the first taxpayer engaged in more egregious conduct than
the second taxpayer, because the first taxpayer engaged in a transaction that
the IRS had specifically identified in advance as a tax shelter. In contrast,
the second taxpayer might have engaged in a novel transaction that had not
yet been addressed by the courts or the IRS, and taken a good faith position
that her claimed benefits were allowable.
After the enactment of the new economic substance penalty, whether
taxpayers are on notice as to which particular transactions are abusive is no
longer relevant to how the taxpayer will be penalized. The sole factor that
determines whether or not a taxpayer can assert a reasonable cause and
good faith defense is if the economic substance doctrine was the means by
which a court or the IRS chose to disallow the claimed tax benefits.
Taxpayers that partake in tax shelters that violate a provision of the Code
will be better off than taxpayers that undertake novel transactions that
comply with the letter of the Code but are later found to lack economic
substance and a business purpose. All of these tax shelter participants
should be subject to heightened penalty standards, but the disparities in
standards in the new accuracy-related penalty regime do not make sense.
B.

Disparities Lead to Disparate Treatment

The discrepancy in standards brought about by the new strict liability
penalty frustrates the IRS‟s and Congress‟s overall goal of promoting
voluntary taxpayer compliance, just as adding a fourth tax shelter penalty
frustrates that goal by making the tax shelter penalty regime overly
complex.246
The IRS‟s 1989 task force report on civil tax penalties concluded that,
in addition to the importance of comprehensibility, an important way to
promote voluntary compliance through tax penalties is to ensure that those
penalties reflect the fairness of the tax system.247 Taxpayers who feel that
tax penalties are fair are more likely to be motivated to comply with the tax
law. The task force further established that an essential aspect of
establishing the fairness of the system is for tax penalties to be consistent,
which includes consistency with the taxpayer‟s own prior experience and

been previously listed by the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010). There is no
reasonable cause exception if the transaction is undisclosed.
246. See supra Part IV.B.
247. See IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, § 20.1.1.2.2, at 7; Tax Analysts II,
supra note 194, at 19 (describing the philosophy of penalties), and accompanying text.
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consistency between similarly situated taxpayers.248 The IRS has also
reiterated this goal more recently in its Penalty Handbook, stating that
taxpayers‟ “overall confidence in the tax system is jeopardized” when
penalties do not apply consistently in similar situations.249
The IRS task force went a step further and identified broad principles
that should be followed in enacting penalty legislation to ensure that the
goals of fairness and consistency are met. One of these core principles
includes ensuring that the standards in penalties are logically tied to the
level of culpability of the conduct being penalized. The Task Force stated:
Penalty programs should consistently identify and assert penalties
against those taxpayers who are the most culpable either because
of the extent of a particular violation or the consistent pattern of
violations over time. Those who deviate farthest from a standard
of behavior should be the ones who receive the greatest penalty
(as well as having the greatest likelihood of getting caught). This
may have implications for the design of penalties -- leading to a
preference for graduated penalties -- and may have implications
for the types of taxpayer information that should be available to
IRS.250
The task force‟s emphasis on consistency was also echoed by
Congress when it overhauled the former penalty regime in 1989 in favor of
a system that was more closely tailored to the goal of promoting voluntary
compliance.251 The importance of consistency has also been highlighted by
tax practitioners, including the ABA Section of Taxation, which recently
stated that penalties must be both “consistent” and “logical” to be effective
in achieving voluntary compliance.252
Part IV.B described how the current tax shelter penalty regime has
trended away from the IRS and Congress‟s stated policy of enacting
penalties that are simple and easy to understand, and argued that the
economic substance penalty further frustrates this policy. Similarly, the
varying standards in tax shelter penalties that have evolved over the past
three decades are increasingly at odds with the policy of promoting fairness
through consistency. The ABA Section of Taxation correctly noted that
“[t]he flurry of recent legislation enacting penalties relating to potentially
248. Tax Analysts II, supra note 194, at 51.
249. IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 7 (describing the IRS‟s approach to
tax penalties). See also IRS Policy Statement 20-1, supra note 193, at 7 (describing the
IRS‟s approach to tax penalties).
250. Tax Analysts II, supra note 194, at 51-52.
251. See, e.g., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98.
252. Tax Analysts III, supra note 200, at 2 (reporting on ABA Section of Taxation
setting forth recommendations for federal civil tax penalty reform). See also Report on
Civil Tax Penalties, supra note 98, at 6 (describing the way in which “penalties should treat
similarly situated taxpayers similarly”).
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abusive transactions had made this area of the penalty regime among the
most inconsistent . . . .”253
The strict liability aspect of the new economic substance penalty is a
significant setback in promoting consistency in tax penalties. The
inevitable result of applying strict liability to violations of the economic
substance doctrine but not to other tax shelter penalties is that some tax
shelter participants will be able to avail themselves of a reasonable cause
defense while others who are subject to the new economic substance
penalty will not. This is a prime example of similarly situated taxpayers
being treated differently.
Part IV.B also argued that Congress should not have enacted a new tax
shelter penalty without thoroughly considering the effectiveness of the
current accuracy-related penalty regime in addressing violations of the
economic substance doctrine. The same principle holds true for the new
strict liability standard, and we are left with the impression that Congress
did not fully think things through. As the IRS task force observed, fairness
and consistency require that taxpayers who engage in more culpable
conduct be penalized more harshly than taxpayers who engage in conduct
that is less egregious.254 If Congress wants to introduce a new, stricter
penalty standard into the accuracy-related regime, that standard should be
clearly tied to the conduct of “those who deviate farthest”255 from
established standards of behavior.
It is possible that the downsides of strict liability are outweighed by
the benefits that would be gained in promoting voluntary compliance and
deterring taxpayers from participating in abusive tax shelters. However, if
Congress‟s aim is to apply strict liability to tax shelters, then all of the
accuracy-related penalties aimed at tax shelters should provide for this
standard. If Congress did not intend to impose strict liability across the
board, then it should clearly separate and identify only the most egregious
conduct for strict liability, leaving a reasonable cause defense in place for
less egregious transactions. Regardless of the approach, if the accuracyrelated penalty regime is to be perceived as fair and consistently applied, it
should be readily apparent to taxpayers why stricter penalties apply to some
transactions and more lenient penalties apply to others. The new strict
liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine misses
the mark here, as it arbitrarily singles out some tax shelters for strict
liability without a limitation for only the worst kinds of tax shelters.
253. Tax Analysts III, supra note 200, at 6 (reporting on ABA Section on Taxation
emphasizing that penalties must be consistent).
254. See IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 52 (describing the IRS‟s approach
to tax penalties). See also IRS Policy Statement 20-1, supra note 193, at 7 (describing the
IRS‟s approach to tax penalties).
255. IRS Policy Statement 20-1, supra note 193, at 52.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that enacting a separate penalty provision for
violations of the economic substance doctrine was wholly unnecessary in
light of the current accuracy-related penalties that are aimed specifically at
tax shelters. The new economic substance penalty does not fill a gap left
open by these other penalties, but rather adds a redundant, fourth tax shelter
penalty to the mix. This inevitably adds undue complexity to the penalty
regime, which in turn frustrates Congress‟s overall goal of promoting
voluntary compliance through tax penalties.
This article has further argued that the strict liability aspect of the new
economic substance penalty cannot be reconciled with the fact that the
other tax shelter penalties provide for various forms of a reasonable cause
defense. The only way to properly justify a new tax shelter penalty with
strict liability would be to specifically tie that penalty to the most egregious
forms of taxpayer conduct. Congress has not done that in the case of the
economic substance penalty.
Without a coherent framework that ties stricter tax penalties to more
egregious conduct, taxpayers are left trying to make sense of the
inconsistent standards in the current tax shelter penalty regime. The only
discernible pattern that has emerged from the evolution of tax shelter
penalty legislation over the past three decades is that the penalty that is
“last in time” is the strictest. Without any coherent explanation from
Congress, it is hard not to question whether the economic substance
doctrine was singled out for strict liability because the codification of the
economic substance doctrine happened to be the latest phase in tax shelter
reform. Congress had already tightened the reins on the reasonable cause
defense significantly with respect to tax shelters (within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 6662(d)) and reportable transaction understatements. If they felt
the need to take it one step further, there was nowhere else to go from there
but strict liability.
The inconsistencies in the penalty regime also make it easy to
understand why critics have suggested that strict liability was included in
the new legislation not because it was seen as appropriate for violations of
the economic substance doctrine, but because it made revenue estimates
higher (making the health care reconciliation bill more palatable).256 These
considerations may be inevitable facets of the political process, but they are
not valid justifications for inserting a new strict liability penalty into an
already complex tax shelter penalty regime.

256. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 1, 4; Stretch et al., supra
note 98, at 1361; Ventry, supra note 71, at 1410; and text accompanying note 112.
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APPENDIX A: Taxpayer Defenses to Accuracy-Related
PENALTIES257
Non-Tax Shelter
Substantial
Understatement

For all taxpayers:

Gross
Valuation
Misstatement
Penalty

Substantial
Understatement
Penalty for
Tax Shelters

For all

For corporations:

taxpayers:
Reasonable cause

Heightened

and good faith

Reasonable

reasonable cause

(§ 6664(c))

cause and good

and good faith

Reportable
Transaction
Understatement
Penalty
Transactions not

For all

lacking economic

taxpayers:

substance:
None, strict
Heightened

liability
(§ 6664(c))

faith

requiring, at a

reasonable cause and

(§ 6664(c))

minimum,

good faith requiring,

authority

substantial

at a minimum,

(§ 6662(d)(2)(B))

authority +

disclosure+

reasonable belief

substantial authority

Reasonable basis +

that position more

+ reasonable belief

disclosure

likely than not

that position more

(§ 6662(d)(2)(B)

correct

likely than not

(§ 1.6664-4(f))

correct (§ 6664(d))

For individuals:

Transactions lacking

Substantial

Economic
Substance
Doctrine
Penalty

economic substance:
Reasonable cause
and good faith (§

None, strict liability

6664(c))

(§ 6662(d))

257. The four tax shelter penalties are juxtaposed with the substantial understatement
penalty for comparison purposes only. The table does not reflect all accuracy-related
penalties, including the penalty for negligence or disregard of rules and regulations under
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (West 2010).

